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ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW:
THE EVOLUTION OF A LEGAL DOCTRINE
By

W

STEFAN
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RIESENFELD*

the following pages were written the world witnessed
events which demonstrated with brutal clarity the complete collapse of the international community and its traditional
legal order. It is almost impossible to imagine that international
law in its classical sense, as the law regulating the relations
among sixty odd members of a family of nations, can and ever
will be revived and revitalized along the lines shaped during the
past three centuries. Yet the American courts, at the present as
well as in the future, will be confronted with questions involving
foreign relations.
It might even be that in times like ours the treatment by the
courts of legal issues which involve foreign relations has gained
increasing importance in a country which wants to stay out of
foreign embroilment without sacrificing its ideals of an administration of justice. One of the questions which has caused much
headache to judges and lawyers in recent years is the jurisdictional immunity of foreign vessels. A host of new decisions have
been rendered lately in this field, and the problem is likely to
continue to occupy the American courts as a result of the present
crisis. It is hoped therefore that a scrutiny of what the courts
have done in these cases and an attempt to gather from their
decisions the tendencies for the future development in this
branch of the law will be of value to the admiralty and international lawyers in spite of the changing features of the globe.
The cases which have brought new life to this branch of the
law are in England: the case of Compania Navi era Vascongado
IILE

*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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v. Steamship Cristina and Persons, finally decided by the House
of Lords on March 3, 1938;1 the case of Government of the
Republic of Spain v. Arantzazu Mendi, likewise decided by the
House of Lords on February 2, 1939;' the case of The Abodi
Mendi, decided by the Court of Appeal on February 22, 1939 ;3
the case of The Arraiz, decided by the Admiralty Division on
May 2, 1938; 4 and the case of El Neptuno, decided by the Admiralty Division on July 29, 19385 to which as a semi-comical
interlude the case of The Ainazone, decided by the Admiralty
Division on May 8, 19396 may be added. In the United States
the decisions pertaining to our subject are the case of Cornpania
Espanola de Navigacion Maritian S. A. v. The Navemnar,
decided by the United States Supreme Court on January 31,
1938, 7 and the case of Ervin v. Quintanilla decided by the circuit
court of appeals for the fifth circuit on November 18, 1938,8 to
which the case of Yokohama Specie Bank v. Chengfing T. Wang a
may be added. Most of these cases have attracted the attention
of commentators in various legal periodicals.' Their observations
1[19381 A. C. 485, 107 L. J. P. 1, affirming the decision of the Court
of Appeal of Nov. 8, 1937, (1937) 59 Lloyd's L. Rep. 47, which in turn
affirmed the judgment of the Admiralty Division rendered by Mr. Justice
Bucknill on July 30, 1937, (1937) 59 Lloyd's L. Rep. 1.
2[19391 A. C. 256, 108 L. J. P. 55, affirming the decision of the Court

of Appeal of Nov. 1, 1938, [1939] P. 37, 108 L. J. P. 2, affirming a judgment of the Admiralty Division rendered by Mr. Justice Bucknill on June
17, 1938 [1938] P. 233.
s[1939] P. 178, 108 L. J. P. 60.
4(1938) 61 Lloyd's L. Rep. 39.
15(1938) 62 Lloyd's L. Rep. 7.
6(1939) [1939] P. 322, 108 L. J. P. 150.
7(1938) 303 U. S. 68, 58 Sup. Ct. 432, 82 L. Ed. 667, rev'g (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 673, which in turn reversed (E.D.N.Y. 1937)
18 F. Supp. 153. After the Supreme Court decision, the case again came
before the district court, (E.D.N.Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 495, and its
decision was reversed by the circuit court of appeals on March 6th, 1939.
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 444. This decree was (after one more
unsuccessful attempt) finally vacated (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d)
783.
s(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 935.
sa(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 329.
"See particularly Lauterpacht, Note on The Cristina, (1938) 54 Law
Q. Rev. 339; Lauterpacht, Recognition of Insurgents as a de Facto Government, (1939) 3 Modern L. Rev. 1 (dealing with The Arantzazu Mendi);
Keith, The Jurisdiction of British Courts over Foreign Sovereigns, (1938)
50 Juridical Rev. 179; Mann, Notes on Immunity of Sovereign States,
(1938) 2 Modern L. Rev. 57; Jennings, Recognition and Sovereign
Immunities, (1939) 2 Modern L. Rev. 287; Note on Impleading a Foreign
Sovereign, (1938) 186 L. T. 41; Note on Ships and States, (1938) 186
L. T. 440; Case note on The Cristina, (1939) 39 Col. L. Rev. 510; Hyde,
Concerning the Navemar, (1939) 33 Am. J. Int. L. 530; Comments on
the Navemar decisions in (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 827; (1937) 37 Col.
L. Rev. 655; (1938) 16 Tex. L. Rev. 582; and (1938) 6 Geo. Wash. L.

Rev. 222, 542.
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may furnish some further help for the understanding of the
intricate topic.
I. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
At the outset it is necessary to emphasize that only the question of the immunity of the ship itself from the exercise of jurisdiction by the coastal state will be treated, not the immunities
relating to certain persons on, or connected with the vessel, nor
to acts occurring on board. In other words the discussion will be
confined to the immunity with respect to the object itself."0
It is believed that this restriction has its good reason. To be
bure, tn the one hand the immunity of foreign vessels probably
belongs to the great class of immunities from the exercise of
jurisdiction by the territorial state which are enjoyed by foreign
states, certain persons in their service, and certain instrumentalities in their use;" to be sure, furthermore, these immunities
may all spring from one and the same rationale, namely that
international comity, founded on the idea of a community of
nations, requires that a state in these instances refrains from the
normal exercise of its power.' On the other hand, however, in
0
1n continental literature this immunity of objects is sometimes designated with what could be translated as "objective exterritoriality." Thus
Van Praag uses the term "exterritorialit6 r~elle" in his monumental work,
Juridiction et Droit International (1915) 140, note 340, p. 357 ff, 1935
Supp. p. 167 ff. Similarly German writers speak of "Real-extraterritorialitkt" e. g. Hiibler, Die Magistraturen des V61kerrechtlichen Verkehrs (1900).
Unfortunately Lord Atkin used the term "objective
exterritoriality" in quite a different sense in his opinion in the case of
Chung Chi Cheung v. The King [1939] A. C. 160, 108 L. J. P. C. 17,
namely to designate the most extreme form of the theory of exterritoriality

covering the immunity of the vessel itself as well as the immunities

relating to persons on board of the same and to acts committed thereon.
"The literature dealing with the different immunities is very copious;
but apart from the general treatises of international law there exists only
one monograph dealing with the whole field, Van Praag's, Juridiction et
Droit International (1915), and 1935 Supplement. There -are, however,
important studies dealing with large sectors of the area. Mention should be
made particularly of Miss Allen's book on The Position of Foreign States
before National Courts (1933) and of the Draft Convention on the
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States by the Harvard
Research in International Law, (1932) 26 Am. J. Int. L., Supplement.
Of articles, one by Fairman entitled Some Disputed Applications of the
Principle of State Immunity, (1928) 22 Am. J. Int. L. 566 is especially
illuminating.
"It is very difficult to give any more substantial rationalization for
the doctrine of sovereign immunity than the reference to international
comity. Stating that an exercise of jurisdiction in these cases would
infringe upon the "equality," the "independence," or the "honor" of the
foreign state is hardly more than using a faion de parler. All that can
be said is that these exemptions have become a tradition whose disobservance would cause unnecessary international conflicts, and whose observance
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hardly any other branch of international law have over-generalizations and the use of catchwords and formulae caused as great
a confusion as in the field of immunities of foreign states.
This holds true particularly with regard to the notion of
exterritoriality,which has been employed to describe and circumscribe these immunities.
It may be conceded that if all the
persons, objects, and localities designated with this term would
be treated in all respects and for all purposes as being outside
of the territory of the state where they are located, the use of the
term would have its good sense and would be even more than a
mere fiction.13 But the truth is that international law and municipal law purporting to be in accordance with the international
rules have not developed that way.14 Persons, objects, or localities
qualified as exterritorial are not considered in all respects and for
all purposes as being outside the territory of the state of location,
but only as being freed from the exercise of certain governmental
functions in certain respects and under certain circumstances.15
is believed to promote and strengthen international intercourse. This seems
to be the modern view of the courts. Thus the Supreme Court of the
United States simply invoked comity in the case of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
United States (1937) 304 U. S. 126, 134, 82 Sup. Ct. 1224, 58 L. Ed. 785,
and Lord Maugham in his opinion in the Cristina Case, [1938] A. C.
485, 518, 107 L. J. P. 1, 17, said:
"In relation to such a rule as the one now under consideration the
word comity, whatever may be its defects in regard to other rules of private
international
law, has a very powerful significance."
13For the reason that they would be freed from the incidents of
territorial presence. Territory, after all, denotes the space within which a
certain complex of legal effects and legal relations are normally materialized by the state. The line where territorial jurisdiction ends and
extraterritorial jurisdiction begins is somewhat blurred. Nowhere can
this be observed better than in the field of jurisdiction over territorial
waters and persons and objects therein. As to the controversies concerning
the legal nature of the territory see Kelsen, Thorie G6n6rale du Droit
International Public, (1932) 42 Receuil des Cours, Acadmie de Droit
International 120, 204; Strupp, Les R~gles G~nrales du Droit de la Paix,
(1934) 47 Receuil des Cours 260, 540; Schnborn, La Nature Juridique
du Territoire, (1929) 30 Receuil des Cours 81; Heinrich, Theorie des
Staatsgebiets (1922); and (1928) 13 Zeitschrift fuir V61kerrecht 194, 325;
Donato Donati, Stato e Territorio (1924); Schnitzer, Staat und Gebietshoheit (1925); Hamel, Das Wesen des Staatsgebiets (1933); Schade,
Wesen
und Umfang des Staatsgebiets (1934).
14 The reasons for this development are evidently that the absolute
doctrine is, as Lord Atkin phrased it in his opinion in the case of Chung
Chi Cheung v. The King, [1939] A. C. 160; 108 L. J. P. C. 17 (P.C.),
"quite impracticable when tested by the actualities of life" (at 174) and
that "the result of any such doctrine would be not to promote the power
and dignity of the foreign sovereign but to lower them." (at 175).
5
'1
Again the opinion of Lord Atkin in the Chung Chi Cheung Case,
in which he tries to demonstrate where the doctrine of absolute exterritoriality would lead to intolerable results, furnishes good examples of the
differentiations between the various issues which must be made. Many
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It is impossible to make any general statements. More and more
dictinctions and refinements have been worked out by the courts
which make it necessary to deal separately with the different
type-situations and the legal relations, persons, and objects involved.16
This view, which is in accord with the modern development,
of his hypothetical solutions are borne out by foreign decisions. Thus,
e. g., in the case of the exterritoriality of embassies the Supreme Court of
Germany has twice decided that a crime committed in the building of a
foreign legation is perpetrated in Germany and can be punished by the
German courts, decision of November 26th, 1880, 3 R. G. St. 30, 9 Journal
du Droit Int. 326; decision of November 4th, 1934, 69 R. G. St. 54,
(1934) 64 Journal du Droit Int. 561. In France and Italy the same rule
applies, case of Mikitschenkoff, Cour de Cassation, Oct. 10th, 1865 [1866]
Dalloz, Pt. I, p. 233; case of Dominici, Corte di Cassezione di Roma,
April 13th, 1923 (1923) II Foro Italiano, Pt. II, p. 294 (dictum only).
But this does not necessarily imply that the building is for all purposes
subject to the local jurisdiction. Thus it should not be subject to execution,
even where the foreign state can be sued for private acts and where its
property when used for private purposes is subject to execution. The Supreme
Court of Czechoslovakia seems to have permitted execution in one instance
for the purpose of enforcing an award of an international tribunal (cf.
De.k, Immunity of Foreign Mission Premises From Local Jurisdiction,
(1929) 23 Am. J. Int. L. 582), but it seems to have reversed its opinion
later, Decision of October 23d, 1930, (1931) 58 Jour. du Droit Int. 719
(unfortunately only a summary is printed). If the premises are only bought
for embassy purposes but not yet so used, the special immunities should
not yet attach; but cf. the note De la competence des tribunaux fran ais
en cas de litige naissant
l'occasion de la vente ' un gouvernement
6tranger d'un immeuble situ6 en France et devant servir d'ambassade,
(1925) 52 Jour. du Droit Int. 236. Accordingly it has been held that a
tenant has the same rights against a foreign state which has bought a
house to establish an embassy as against any other landlord, so long as
the house is not used yet for such purpose, Tribunal Civil de la Seine,
Oct. 30th,
1929, Suede v. Petrochino, (1932) 59 Jour. du Droit Int. 945.
16 See the article by Fairman, Some Disputed Applications of the
Principle of State Immunity (1928) 22 Am. J. Int. L. 566. A good
example of the fine distinctions which have to be drawn is a decision of
the tribunal of Geneva of March 29th, 1927, (54 Journal du Droit International 1179) holding that a man who is sued in Switzerland for support
as the illegitimate father of a child and who at the time when he lived with
the mother had the character of a Yugoslavian diplomatic agent in
Switzerland, and at the time of the suit had the character of a Yugoslavian
agent for Egypt cannot in that suit successfully claim exemption from
jurisdiction in Switzerland. With respect to the question of the termination
of the immunity from suit or execution see also Suarez v. Suarez, [1917]
2 Ch. 131, 86 L. J. Ch. 673 and, on appeal from subsequent proceeding,
(1917) 34 Times L. Rep. 127, and the decision of the Cour de Paris,
April 9th, 1925, Laperdrix v. Kouzouboff, (1926) 53 Journal du Droit
Int. 64. With respect to criminal proceedings, conversely it is held in Italy
that the immunity of ambassadors relates to the substantive penal law
(i.e. the criminal responsibility) and not merely to the possibility of a
prosecution during the time of the diplomatic character, see case of
Wohotich, Cassazione del Regno, April 19th, 1933, (1933) Il Foro Italiano,
Pt. II, p. 430. It is however, generally recognized that the immunity pertains
also to the private affairs of the diplomatic agent, De Meeils v. Forzano,
Cassazione del Regno 1939 (1940) 32 Rivista di diritto internazionale 93.
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recently has found a clear recognition by Lord Atkin in the
opinion which he rendered per curiam in the Privy Council case
of Chung Chi Cheung v. The King.- It involved the question
whether the British courts in Hong Kong had jurisdiction to try
to convict a British subject who had killed the British captain
of a Chinese maritime customs cruiser on board of the same
while it was travelling inside British territorial waters, and who
had been turned over to the British police. The Privy Council
took the view that the Hong Kong court had jurisdiction under
the circumstances of the case. Lord Atkin in his opinion considered the evolution of the doctrine of exterritoriality and,
discarding the theory of what he called "objective exterritoriality," he stated:
"The true view is that, in accordance with the conventions of
international law, the territorial sovereign grants to the foreign
sovereigns and their envoys, and public ships and the naval forces
carried by such ships, certain immunities. Some are well settled;
others are uncertain. When the local court is faced with a case
where such immunities come into question, it has to decide
whether in the particular case the immunity exists or not. ..."11
Since, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction in regard to the
vessel as such follows its own rules which need by no means be
coextensive with the principles regarding the exercise of jurisdiction over persons on the ship or connected with the same or
over acts committed on board, it seems practicable not to consider
these other immunities, even though they are quite frequently
dealt with together with the immunity of the ship itself 19 and to
confine the discussion strictly to the treatment of the vessel as a
thing. Again, it seems likewise to be advisable not to study the
immunity of the ship as a thing in connection with the immunities
of other instrumentalities or assets of foreign states. 20
The
"7[1939] A. C. 160, 108 L. J. P. C. 17.
18[19391 A. C. 160, 175, 108 L. J. P. C. 17, 23.

'.Of the literature dealing with the whole field of immunities pertaining
to vessels, to acts committed thereon, to persons on board thereof and to
their crews, see particularly the excellent discussions in 2 Gidel, Le Droit
Public de la Mer, (1932) p. 77 ff., p. 253 ff.; Vol. 3 (1934) p. 212 ff.; 1
Fedozzi, Trattato di Diritto Internazionale, (3d ed. 1938), p. 381 ff.;
Baldoni,
Il Mare Territoriale (1934) p. 83 ff.
20 Recent cases in Anglo-American law dealing with the immunity of
foreign states in respect to other assets or debts are Haile Selassie v.
Cable and Wireless Ltd., [1938] 1 Ch. 549, 107 L. J.Ch. 201; [1938] 1 Ch.
839, 107 L. J.Ch. 380; [1939] 1 Ch. 182, 194, 107 L. J.Ch. 419, 108 L. J.
Ch. 190. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States (1938) 304
U. S. 126, 58 Sup. Ct. 785, 82 L. Ed. 1224; Hannes v. Kingdom of
Roumania Monopolies Institute, (1938) 169 Misc. Rep. 544, 6 N. Y. S.
(2d) 960; modified (1940) 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825:
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particular nature and position of vessels which distinguishes
them from other chattels, and the different traditions and procedures in admiralty makes it at least doubtful whether or not
separate rules apply to them.2 ' Nevertheless it may be said as a
matter of principle that except where the particular situation or
the character of the ship demands otherwise, the treatment should
be analogous.
Finally it should be observed that the scope of this article
covers only the immunity which is accorded to a foreign vessel
because of its connection with a foreign sovereign. Consequently
the immunity which a foreign vessel enjoys regardless of its use
or ownership by a foreign sovereign, merely because it is no
more than passing the territorial waters of another state will not
be treated.

22

II. THE ENGLISH CASES
Usually American and English law possess so many features
in common that a topic needs no individual treatment for each of
them. The precise scope of the sovereign immunity of foreign
vessels is, however, as will appear, decisively determined by the
Lamont v. Travellers Insurance Co., (1939) 281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. (2d)
81 reversing (1938) 254 App. Div. 511, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 295, criticised
by Deik, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity And The New York Court of
Appeals, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 453, see also comments in (1940) 25
Cornell L. Quar. 459 and (1940) 26 Va. L. Rev. 824; Bradford v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, (S.D. N.Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 28; Auer v. Costa (D. Mass.
1938) 23 F. Supp. 22.
2Such difference is asserted by Lord Wright in two dicta contained

in his opinion in The Cristina Case, viz.: (1) "The appellants have
contended that the rule that the sovereign cannot be impleaded is not

absolute or universal and have instanced as possible exceptions cases in
which title to real property in the jurisdictions [is tried?] or suits to
administer a fund in court in which the foreign sovereign is interested, or
representative actions such as debenture-holders' actions where the sovereign
holds debentures. Whatever may be the position in such cases they are
essentially different from, and afford no guidance for, the present case,
and I do not need here to discuss them." [1938] A. C. 485, 506, 107 L. J. P.
1, 11; (2). "It must also be noted that The Cristina, even when in
Cardiff docks, may have, as being a foreign merchant ship, a different
status from an ordinary chattel on land." [1938] A. C. 485, 509, 107 L. J. P.
1, 12. Whether this difference exists because the object concerned is a
vessel or because the admiralty proceedings are of a special nature and
of peculiar effect is a question open to inquiry. The latter reason seems
to have been assumed by Sir Wilfrid Greene in the case of Haile Selassie,
[1938] 1 Ch. 839, 845, 107 L. J. Ch. 380, 382 (C.A.) : "The phrase Irapleading indirectly' . . . refers to such proceedings as admiralty pro-

ceedings in rem where the action in form is an action against the ship."
-2Jessup, Civil Jurisdiction Over Ships in Innocent Passage, comment
on the case of Panama, on behalf of Compania de Navigaci6n Nacional, v.
The United States, decided by the General Claims Commission, United
States and Panama, June 29th, 1933, (1933) 27 Am. J. Int. L. 747.
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nature and the methods of the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction in rem. Since here American and English law show basic
differences, 23 it seems advisable to deal with our problem
separately for the two systems.
A. THE ENGLISH DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE CRISTINA

CASE.

24

The recent case of Compania Naviera Vascongado v,.Steam-

ship Cristina and Persons was the first instance in which the
House of Lords had to concern itself with the immunity of a
foreign vessel from the jurisdiction of the British courts because
of its connection with a foreign sovereign. But prior to that time
the Admiralty Division and the Court of Appeal had a number
of occasions to work out the different ramifications of the principle of exemption from jurisdiction, and had gone, as Lord
Macmillan observed in his opinion, "a long way in extending the
doctrine of immunity."25 They did so in nineteen cases, of which
seven were decided in the period between 182020 and the outbreak
of the World War, and the remainder thereafter.2 7 An analysis of
2
30n the difference between American and English law with respect
to the jurisdiction in rem in admiralty and the doctrine of maritime liens
see Hebert, The Origin and Nature of Maritime Liens, (1930) 4 Tulane
L. Rev. 381; Raymond, Sovereign Immunity in Modern Admiralty Law,
(1931) 9 Tex. L. Rev. 519, 523, footnotes 10, 11; Robinson, Admiralty
Law (1939) 363. A good and instructive summary of the English law is
the section "Admiralty" by Lord Merrivale and Sir Philip Langton in 1
Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1931) 77 ff.; see also the statement
by Lord Wright in The Cristina Case, [1938] A. C. 485, 504, 107 L. J.P.
1, 10 and in addition, The Beldis, (1936] P. 51, 106 L. J. P. 22; The
Tervaete, [1922] P. 259, 91 L. J. P. 213; The Zigurds, [1932] P. 113,
101 L. J.P. 75.
24Of the literature may be mentioned, apart from Raymond, Sovereign
Immunity in Modern Admiralty Law, (1931) 9 Tex. L. Rev. 519, Roscoe,
La Condition Juridique des Navires Appartenant a l'Etat et l'Immunit6
des Etats an Point de Vue de Droit Maritime, II, Angleterre, (1922) 34
Revue International du Droit Maritime 24 ff.; Hill, Report to the Comit
Maritime International, Bulletin 57, p. 5; McNair, The Judicial Recognition of Foreign States and Governments and the Immunity of Public
Ships, (1922) 2 British Yearbook of Int. L. 57.
25[1938] A. C. 485, 498, 107 L. J.P. 1.
26These cases are The Prins Frederik, (1820) 2 Dods. 451; The
Ticonderoga, (1857) Swabey (Adm.) Cas. 215; The Charkieh, (1873)
L. R. 8 Q. B. 197, 42 L. J.N. S. Q. B. 75 (on writ on prohibition), and
(1873) 4 Adm. & Eccl. 59, 42 L. J.Adm. 17 (on the merits) ; The Constitution, (1879) 4 P. D. 39, 48 L. J.P. 13; The Parlement Beige, (1879) 4
P. D. 129, 48 L. J.P. 19, reversed on appeal, (1880) 5 P. D. 197; The
Newbattle, (1885) 10 P. D. 33, 54 L. J.P. 16; The Jassy, [1905] P. 270, 75
L. J.P. 93.
27The Messicano, (1916) 32 Times L. Rep. 519; The Erissos, (1917)
1917 Lloyd's List Newspaper Report of Law Cases, Oct. 24th, pp. 5, 7,
8; abstract in McNair, The Judicial Recognition of Foreign States and
Governments, (1922) 2 British Yearbook of Int. Law 57, 71; The Espo-
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these decisions is indispensable for a full understanding of the
import of the Cristina decision."
I. CASES PRIOR "TO WORLD WA.-The pre-war cases were,
generally speaking, less complicated than the twelve following
ones because they involved no question of title or restoration of
possession but merely the enforcement of maritime liens for
collision or salvage. However, they illustrate neatly the growth
of the doctrine. In the very first of all of them, The Prins
Frederik,2 extensive arguments pro and contra according immunity were made, but the issue finally remained undecided. The
facts of the case were as follows. The Prins Frederik, a Dutch
ship of war carrying a load of spices, suffered damages on a
trip and was salvaged by a British boat. She later came to
Plymouth, and was there arrested by the salvors. The person who
took custody under the authority of the court was compelled by
the captain to leave the vessel, and the matter came to trial. The
captain appeared under protest. The case was argued before Sir
William Scott (later Baron Stowell). The King's advocate and
the advocate of the Admiralty took the side of the captain. Both
law officers of the crown laid emphasis on the character of the
vessel as a man-of-war, and argued that such ships were immune
from private claims because of their particular destination.3 0 Sir
sende, 1918 Lloyd's List Newspaper Report of Law Cases, Febr. 19th
p. 5, Febr. 27th p. 6; abstract in McNair, The Judicial Recognition of
Foreign States and Governments, (1922) 2 British Yearbook of Int. Law,
57, 70 note 1; The Crimdon, (1918) 35 Times L. Rep. 81; The Neptune,
(1919) P. 17, 88 L. J. P. 94; The Gagara, (1919) 35 Times L. Rep. 243
(Adm.), [1919] P. 95, 88 L. J. P. 101 (C.A.) ; The Annette and The Dora,
[1919] P. 105, 88 L. J. P. 107, The Porto Alexandre, (1919) 36 Times
L. Rep. 28 (Adm.), [1920] P. 30, 91 L. J. P. 213 (C.A.); The Tervaete,
[1922] P. 197 (Adm.), [1922] P. 259, 92 L. J. P. 23 (C.A.) ; The Sylvan
Arrow, [1923] P. 220; The Jupiter I [1924] P. 236, 91 L. J. P. 156 (Adm.
and C.A.) The Jupiter II, [1925] P. 69, L. J. P. 59 (C.A.) ; The Jupiter
III, [1927] P. 122, 96 L. J. P. 62 (Adm.) ; [1927] Pa 250, 97 L. J. P. 33
(C.A.);
The Meandros, [1925] P. 61, 94 L. J. P. 61 (Adm.).
28
1n addition thereto one Irish, one Scottish, one Canadian and one
South-African case may be mentioned, namely The Eolo, [1918] 2 1. R. 78;

Owners of S. S. Victoria v. Owners of S. S. Quillwark, 1922 Scots Law
Times Reports 68; Brown v. S. S. Indo-chine, [1922] 21 Canada Exch.
Rep. 406 and De Howorth v. The S. S. India, South African Law Reports,
[1921] Cape Prov. Div. 451.
20(1820)
2 Dods. 451 (Adm.).
30 In favor of their assertion they invoked: (a) the Roman law theory
of "res extra commercium" as adopted by text-writers of international
law; (b) two foreign precedents, namely a case, reported by Bynkershoek,
of an attachment of Spanish war vessels attempted by Dutch creditors of
the King of Spain, and the American Supreme Court case of the Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, (1812) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 116, 3 L. Ed. 287.
Counsels for the salvors argued that even war vessels were liable according
to the law of nations for claims for services rendered to their benefit.
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William, however, was in doubt whether the case was technically
a salvage case, and "sufficient to justify the raising of a question
as to the jurisdiction of the court upon a very nice and delicate
subject." 31 Therefore it was suggested that the salvors should
first apply to the Dutch Government for compensation. Such an
arrangement was made, and Sir William fixed later the compen3 2
sation by award upon the request of the Dutch ambassador.
The next case which at least touched upon the issue was that
of The Ticonderoga."3 There a collision claim was made against
a privately owned American boat, which at the time of the
collision was chartered to the French Government and, by order
of this government, -was in tow of the steamer Sea Nymph. The
court held that these circumstances did not relieve the ship from
liability. 4 It may be observed that the owners claimed absence of
liability not because of the use by a foreign government but on
general principles of maritime law governing responsibility.
In the following case, where sovereign immunity was expressly asserted, the claim was likewise not successful. This was
the case of The Charkieh.35 There claims were made against a
vessel of the Khedive of Egypt for a collision which occurred in
the Thames river. The Charkieh had come to England for
certain repairs. She carried cargo under a charter to a British
subject and was entered at the Customs House like an ordinary
merchant vessel, but flying the flag of the Imperial Ottoman
Navy. After the Court of Queens Bench Division had denied the
application by the Khedive for a writ of prohibition," the case
31(1820) 2 Dods. 451, 480.

32

1n this award he laid down the proposition that "the first application

for recompense, in the nature of salvage, ought, in the case of a ship of

war belonging to a foreign state, to have been made to the representative
of that state resident in this country." (1820) 2 Dods. 451, 484. It seems
clear, in view of this statement, that Sir William did not intimate any
final position on the immunity question, as sometimes is asserted erroneously.
33(1857) Swabey (Adm.)
215.
34
The case was later explained in the case of The Sylvan Arrow,
[1923] P. 220, 92 L. 3. P. 23. The court there adverted to the fact that
The Ticonderoga was merely in the service of the French Government, but
that master and crew were apparently appointed and paid by the owners.
The master was, however, according to the statement of the original report,
"bound to employ the steamer in question, and to pursue such course as
the French government thought most convenient." Swabey 215, 217.
35(1873) 4 Adm. & Eccl. 59, 42 L. 3. N. S. Adm. 17.
36(1873) L. R. 8 Q. B. Cas. 197, 42 L. J.N. S. Q. B. 75. The court
denied the writ because "the question was one on international law which
was peculiarly in the province of the Court of Admiralty."
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came to trial before the Admiralty Judge, Sir Robert Phillimore.
The Khedive appeared under protest against the jurisdiction. Sir
Robert overruled the protest and based his decision explicitly
upon three different grounds, namely:
"First, that his highness the Khedive, however exalted his
position and distinguished his rank, has failed to establish that he
is entitled to the privileges of a sovereign prince, according to the
criteria of sovereignty required by the reason of the thing and,
by the usage and practice of nations... ;
Secondly, that, on the assumption he is entitled to such privilege, it would not oust the jurisdiction of this court in the particular proceeding which has been instituted against the ship;
"And, thirdly, that assuming the privilege to exist, it has
been waived with reference to this ship by the conduct of the
person who claims it." 37
Only the second and the third reasons given in the opinion
merit particular attention in connection with this study. Sir Robert
felt strongly the dilemma which exists in these cases between
"respecting the personal dignity and convenience of the sovereign" and "the administration of justice to the subject." The
way out, he thought, was offered by the procedural distinction
between writs in rem and writs in personam. The former were,
according to him, not absolutely in conflict with the immunity
from suit accorded by international comity to foreign sovereigns.
"Proceedings of this kind, in rem, may in some cases at least
be instituted without any violation of international law, though
the owner of the res be in the category of persons privileged from
personal suit." 3"
He believed this to be true even with regard to war vessels in so
far as suits in rem against them for salvage and collision are
concerned. But he stated cautiously that it was not necessary to
announce so broad a proposition in the instant case, as The
Charkieh could not claim exemption as a war vessel. 89 It is
interesting to note, however, that in spite of all this Sir Robert
also rested the decision upon a waiver of the immunity by the
Khedive, implied by his conduct.
It was only in the fourth case in this line, The Constitution,
that immunity was for the first time actually granted to a foreign
vessel.' 0 This case involved an application for arrest to enforce
claims for salvage services rendered to the United States frigate
87(1873) 4 Adm. & Ece. 59, 100, 42 L. J.Adm. 17.
38(1873) 4 Adm. & Ecc. 59, 93, 42 L. J. Adm. 17.
390(1873) 4 Adm. & Ecc. 59, 96, 42 L. J.Adm. 17.
40(1879) L. R. 4 P. D. 39, 48 L. 3. P. 13.
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Constitution. Counsel for the United States and the Admiralty
advocate moved that no warrant for arrest should issue. Sir
Robert Phillimore accordingly denied the application, thus retreating from his position taken in The Charkieh, that a war
vessel also might be liable for salvage claims. He distinguished
The Charkieh expressly on the ground that there no war vessel
was involved.
The following case of The Parlement Belge4 ' is the decision
which has become the "leading authority" 42 in England. The
litigation arose out of a collision between the plaintiff's boat and
The Parlement Belge, which was a vessel owned by the Belgian
state and employed primarily in carrying the mails, but also in
The attorney general protested against the
other commerce.
jurisdiction of the court and prayed for dismissal. Sir Robert
Phillimore gave default judgment for the plaintiffs because The
Parlernent Belge did not belong "to that category of public
vessels which are exempt from process of law and all private
claims." On appeal his judgment was reversed in a lengthy
opinion written by the (then) Lord Justice Brett. Even though
the judgment is far from being clear in all parts it seems to lay
down four propositions of law. The first one was that no state
can exercise jurisdiction over the public property of any state
which is destined to public use.43 The second one was that a
proceeding in rem indirectly impleads the owner, and that therefore a proceeding in rem against a foreign state vessel indirectly
impleads the foreign state.44 The third was that, after the ship
was declared by the foreign sovereign "to be in his possession as
sovereign and to be a public vessel of the state," it seemed "very
difficult to say that any court can inquire by contentious testimony
41(1879) L. R. 4 P. D. 129, 48 L. J. P. 18, reversed by Court of Appeal,
(1880) L. R. 5 P. D. 197.
42
Lord Maugham in The Cristina, [1938] A. C. 485, 518, 107 L. J. P. 1.
43Cf (1880) L. R. 5 P. D. 197, 214: "The principle to be deduced
from all these cases is that, as a consequence of the absolute independence
of every sovereign authority, and of international comity which induced

every sovereign state to respect the independence and dignity of other
sovereign states, each and every one declines to exercise by means of its
courts any of its -territorial jurisdiction . . . over the public property of
any state which is destined to public use. ...
44(1880) L. R. 5, P. D. 197, 217; see also at p. 220: "If the remedy
sought by an action in riemagainst public property is, as we think it is, an
indirect mode of exercising the authority of the court against the owner
of the property, then the attempt to exercise such authority is an attempt
inconsistent with 'the":indeondence and equality of, the state which is
'
represented by such' owiern"
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whether that declaration is or is not correct.! ' "5 The last proposition was that, even if there could be such inquiry, a ship used only
subserviently for trading purposes did not lose its immunity.o
It can easily be seen that these four propositions are not at all
co-extensive in scope, and that particularly the second and the
third one went far beyond the facts of the case.4 7 But they
influenced the growth of the law considerably.
The two remaining pre-war cases did not contribute anything
essentially new to the development. One involved merely a point
of statutory construction", the other was substantially on all
fours with The Parlement Belge. 9
II. DURING AND AFTER THE WORLD WAR.-The cases
arising after the beginning of the world war presented new and
complicated issues to the courts. On the one hand the principle of
sovereign immunity from money claims iri rem for salvage,
collision or wages had to undergo further elaboration, owing
particularly to the use of privately owned ships by foreign
governments either by charter or by requisition. On the other
hand confiscation of private vessels by foreign governments led
to attempts of obtaining their restitution in British courts. The
problem of the position of an unrecognized government added to
the difficulties. It is probably helpful to distinguish between the
cases in which the enforcement of certain liabilities was attempted
by in rem suits and those in which restoration was claimed.
(a). CASES INVOLVING THE ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILiTr.-The

scope and nature of the sovereign immunity from the enforcement
L. R. 5, P. D. 197, 219.
"0(1880) L. R. 5, P. D. 197, 220.
47If a proceeding in rem impleads the owner and the owner cannot be
impleaded, any property, not only property destined to public use would
be exempt; and if the mere claim suffices, any Properly claimed by a foreign
GovCne1ncnt as its own would be free. In reality all that was necessary to
decide the case was that a vessel used primarily as mail packet and
subordinately
as trading boat enjoyed sovereign immunity.
4
$The Newbattle, (1885) L. R. 10 P. D. 33, 54 L. 3. P. 16. The
Newbattle collided with a mail packet of Belgium. The Belgian King sued
in rem, and arrested the Newbattle. Her owners interposed a counterclaim
and plaintiff's suit was stayed until he gave security to answer the counterclaim under section 34 of the Admiralty Court Act of 1861. Held: Such
order was not in violation of the sovereign immunity of the plaintiff.
49The Jassy, [19061 P. 270, 75 L. J. P. -93.- Suit in rem and arrest of
the steamship Jassy for collision. The Roumanian Chargi d'Affaires
claimed sovereign immunity because the boat was employed for public
purpose in connection with the national railroads of Roumania. The secretary of state for foreign affairs communicated this letter to the registrar
of the Admiralty Court. Thereupon the actidii Was dismissed.
45(1880)
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against the ship of liability for wages, salvage and collision was
further elaborated in a group of nine cases. One of the issues to
be determined was the position of ships which were not owned
by the foreign government but only temporarily used either
pursuant to a requisition or to a time charter. Before the world
war this question had been touched upon only once, in the above
5
"
mentioned decision of The Ticonderoga.
The first case in this group was The Messicano.51 It involved
the question as to whether an action in rem could be maintained
for a collision which had occurred before the outbreak of the war
against a vessel which at the time suit was brought and warrant
for arrest sued out was requisitioned by the Italian Government
and in actual use for carrying war material. The owners claimed
immunity. The court set aside the warrant for arrest, but declared
the service of the writ to be good, thus compelling the defendant
owners either to appear or to suffer default judgment.52 The
case therefore is important for two propositions. In the first place
it established the rule that a foreign boat which is used for public
purposes enjoys sovereign immunities even though it is not owned
by the foreign government, but is merely in governmental service
under requisition for the war time. Second, it applied to vessels
requisitioned by foreign governments the distinction between
immunity from arrest and immunity from suit, which had been
worked out shortly before as to British privately owned vessels
requisitioned by and in the service of the Crown in the case of The
Broadnayne,53 and had later been re-applied to foreign privately
50(1857) Swabey (Adm.) 215, see supra text to note 33.
5'(1916) 32 Times L. Rep. 519.
52
The court made the following order: "On the motion of the defendants it is ordered that the appearance entered under protest, the warrant of arrest and the arrest thereunder, and the undertaking to give bail
given under protest, be struck out and set aside; that the time for entering
appearance be extended for eight days from this date; and that all further
proceedings in this action with a view to the arrest or the detention of the
ship be stayed for so long as the ship shall remain under requisition in the
service of the Italian Government."
53[1916] P. 64, 85 L. J. P. 153. The case involved an action for salvage
brought against a British private ship which was requisitioned by the
British Government. The salvors had served a writ in rem on the vessel,
and the owners entered an appearance. The treasury solicitor intervened on
behalf of the crown, and moved to set the writ and all subsequent proceedings aside. The motion was denied by the Admiralty Division. The
Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and ordered "that all further proceedings in this action with a view to the arrest or detention of the ship be
stayed for so long as the ship shall remain under requisition in the service
of the crown." Two points should be noted. The court refused expressly
to give any instructions with respect to the action itself, but all three
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owned ships in requisition service of the British Crown in the
case of The Koursk.5 4 The effect of this distinction between the
two immunities was that the action in rem against the owner
could be maintained even though the arrest was unlawful and
was either denied or set aside.r
justices who delivered opinions intimated that apart-from the arrest the
action might be continued against the owners. The court furthermore did
not even suggest whether or not, as a matter of substantive law, there
would be any liability of the owners for salvage services rendered to the
ship while being under the requisition.
r41918 Lloyd's List (newspaper report of law cases) June 22d; abstract
in McNair, Judicial Recognition of States and Governments, and the
Immunity of State Ships, (1922) 2 British Year Book of Int. Law, 57, 71.
The Koursk was one of a convoy of five vessels which travelled under the
protection of a British warship in the Mediterranean. She went out of
her course and collided with The Clan Chisholm, which thereupon on her
part collided with The Itria. The owners of The Clan Chisholm sued in
rem and moved for an arrest of The Koursk. The latter vessel was owned
by the Russian Volunteer Fleet Association, but at the time of the suit
(and apparently also at the moment of the collision) was in governmental
service for Great Britain. The Crown claimed that the vessel was wholly
under control and management of his Majesty's Government. The court
thereupon refused the arrest, intimating, however, that plaintiffs had a
maritime lien which they might be able to enforce later. The same incident
gave rise also to two other actions, namely a suit by the owners of The
Itria against The Clan Chisholm, and a suit by the same owners against
The Koursk. The suits by the owners of The Itria against The Clan
Chisholm and by the owners of The Clan Chisholm against The Koursk
were consolidated and the House of Lords apportioned the liability holding
that the blame should be attributed to The Koursk two thirds and to The
Clan Chisholm one third; see (1920) 2 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 244. As a
result of all proceedings the owners of The Clan Chisholm had a judgment
against the Volunteer Fleet Association as owners of The Koursk for
damages, and the latter a much smaller judgment for the costs of the
appeal against the owner of The Clan Chisholm. The Admiralty Division
stayed the execution of the judgment for costs upon the ground that otherwise the immunity of The Koursk and the doubtfulness of the possibility
of an execution in other property of the Volunteer Fleet Association would
put the Association in too advantageous a position. (1920) 4 Lloyd's List
Law Rep. 85. The Koursk returned, however, later to England and being
freed meanwhile from governmental service was lawfully arrested and
condemned in the action by the' owners of The Itria against The Koursk
which was still pending; see [1923] P. 206, 92 L. J. P. 125 (Adm.);
[19241 P. 140, 93 L. J. P. 72 (C.A.).
UtThe distinction mentioned in the text is based in the last analysis
upon the procedural mechanics of the British admiralty practice. In England,
even in a suit in rem, the writ of summons and the warrant for arrest are
separate court orders. It has been held that the service of the writ in rem
upon a ship within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court constitutes
sufficient notice to all the world of the claim, and suffices to give the court
jurisdiction for a default judgment even though the ship was never arrested
and has meanwhile left, The Nautic, [1895] P. 121, 54 L. J. P. 61; cf.
1 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1931) Admiralty, 132. This case was
cited in The Messicano. But this latter decision leaves many questions open:
Can there be a valid service (which is also an exercise of jurisdiction) on
a ship in the possession of a foreign Government? In The Nautik the
service of the writ was undoubtedly good; all that happened was the
departure of the vessel before the arrest. In The Messicano, as well as in
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The principle of immunity in this group of cases was carried
a small step further and extended to privately owned ships in
the public service of foreign governments, without technical
"requisition" by the same, in the two cases of The Erissos6 and
The Crindon" The former decision dealt with a claim for salvage services rendered to a Greek private vessel which was then
and at the time of the suit in the service of the Italian Government for state purposes. She was chartered from the owners for
war service by a British broker firm for the British Government
and allotted by the latter to the Italian Government. No arrest
had been made but the owners had given an undertaking to put
up bail. Counsel appeared also for the Italian Government. Mr.
Justice Hill, even though refraining purposely and explicitly from
using the word "requisition" under the circumstances of the case.
announced that nevertheless the principle of the requisition cases
applied. Consequently he stayed "further proceedings with the
view to detain the vessel as long as she is used for public purposes
by the British or Italian Government," declaring that the writ in
rem as such must stand; the undertaking to put up bail was
discharged because of the impossibility of an arrest of the vessel
in her present employment.
The case of The Crimdon involved a privately owned Swedish
vessel that had collided with the ship of the plaintiffs while she
The Broadmayne, service was accepted by the defendants. Was this acceptance
necessary or would the mere service of the'writ on board of the vessel
have sufficed? Apart from these doubts, what is the value of such proceedings without arrest? If the defendant appears, he might, according to
the English practice, be condemned and execution be levied on other
property as if a writ in personam had been issued, cf. the opinions by Lord
Pickford and Lord Bankes in The Broadmayne, [1916] P. 64, 85 L. J. P.
153, see also The Koursk, (1920) 4 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 85, The
Joannis Vattis, [1922] P. 213, 91 L. J. P. 182; 1 Halsbury's Laws of
England (2d ed. (1931) Admiralty, 82). If he does not appear, default
judgment might be rendered. This would have a twofold effect: (a)
execution may issue thereon in England, if the ship should ever return
freed from requisition; (b) it may be recognized by foreign jurisdictions.
But are there any present means of execution? Could for instance, the
property be sold, subject the government's rights (somehow like a reversionary interest)? Justice Hill in the case of The Crimdon, (1918) 35
Times L. Rep. 81, intimated a negative answer, cf. infra note 58. Would
such execution on the proprietary interest in the vessel be possible against
a requisitioned ship, if the judgment were in personam and the owner a
resident of England? The author is not familiar erlough with English
execution process to suggest any answer.
56(1917) Lloyd's List, (newspaper report of law cases), Oct. 24th.
p. 5, 7, 8; abstract in McNair, Judicial Recognition of States and Govern"ments, (1922) 2 British Yearbook of Int. Law 57, 71.
57(1918) 35 Times L. Rep. 81.
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was employed in the American Army transport service under a
time charter to the United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation. The solicitors for the plaintiffs sued out a writ
in rem, and the solicitors for defendant accepted service but,
requested for an undertaking to put in bail to avoid arrest, did so
only under the condition that the ship was liable to arrest. Meanwhile the ship had sunk and the plaintiffs asked for an order for
bail against defendants. Mr. Justice Hill refused this application.
He took the view that the vessel was not liable to arrest under
the circumstances of the case (which fact, as he stated, however
did not affect the validity of the writ in rem against the owners),
giving the following reasons:
"But when you come to arrest . . . the state which has the
vessel in use for public purposes can claim to have the vessel
released from the arrest of the court, and the method by vhich
the vessel has been put in the service of the state is immaterial.
She may be in the service of the state by requisition without a
written agreement; she may be in the service of the state by
charter party, but how she has come into the service of the state
is, in my view, immaterial so long as she is at the time being used
by the state for public purposes. Nor, to my mind is it material
whether the flag of the vessel is the flag of the state applying to
the court, or the flag of any other country, nor whether the vessel
is one over which the state applying to the court can exercise
compulsory powers of requisition or not."58s
In addition to this rule of the immunity from arrest of privately owned ships temporarily employed for public purposes by
foreign governments in suits in rem for salvage, collision, etc., the
problem of sovereign immunities of foreign vessels from the
rs(1918) 35 Times L. Rep. 81, 82. Justice Hill added an interesting
comment on the question of value of a proceeding in rem without an
arrest or bail (discussed supra, note 55). He said: "The party injured

can compel the private owners to submit to the jurisdiction by a writ in
rem, but unless he can enforce his maritime lien by effective arrest, his
remedy is only a personal judgment, which against a foreign owner may
be valueless, especially where, as in the present case, the vessel may be

lost, while the action is pending. He can, of course, wait and enforce his
maritime lien after the vessel has passed out of the service of the sovereign
state, but again, in the interval, the vessel may be lost, or, if a foreign
vessel, may never return to the plaintiff's country; and, in any case, in the
meantime the plaintiff may lose touch with all his witnesses... " He added:
"I think it is well deserving of some consideration whether machinery
cannot be devised whereby persons having claims against ships which, but
for the privilege of the State, would be enforceable against the ships by
arrest should be enabled to obtain some form of security which . . . should
be as good as that which is given by arrest and holding bail." It is
important to note that the judge did not consider the question whether
the plaintiff would not fare better in suing in personan in the state where
the owner is domiciled and thus minimize the hardships.
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enforcement of liabilities, underwent in general some further
elaboration in the post war period. Apart from two decisions, of
which one was only a re-application of the rule laid down in The
Pcrlement Belge59 and the other no more than an interpretation
of a procedural statute, 60 four cases must be mentioned in this
connection. The first one is the case of The Porto Alexandre.1
This was a formerly German-owned steamship, which had been
requisitioned by the Portuguese Government and later adjudged
a lawful prize by the Portuguese Prize Court. She was engaged in
ordinary trading voyages earning freight. A writ in rem was
served for salvage services rendered. Solicitors for defendant
appeared under protest and moved to set the writ aside. The
Admiralty Division, upon a communication by the Portuguese
Charg6 d'Affaires to the effect that the Porto Alexandre belonged
to the Portuguese Government, set aside the writ. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeal. All three judges agreed that
the employment of the vessel for trading purposes did not deprive
her of her immunity. 2 While this case thus defined the scope of
59The Esposende, (1918) Lloyd's List (newspaper report of law cases),
Feb. 27th, 1918; abstract in McNair, Judicial Recognition of States and
Governments, (1922) 2 British Yearbook of Int. Law 57, 70 note 1, cited
in The Crimdon, (1918) 35 Times L. Rep. 81. A writ in rem, without
warrant for arrest, was served on The Esposende, a former German
steamer which was condemned by the Portuguese Government and employed
to carry munitions. The Portuguese Charg6 d'Affaires claimed that the
boat was a public vessel belonging to the Republic of Portugal. This statement, which was transmitted to the court by the Foreign Office was
considered to be conclusive as to ownership and use and the writ therefore
dismissed, though not without a comment by the court on the inconveniences
of this practice.
6OThe Neptune, [1919] P. 17, 88 L. J. P. 94. The case concerned the
converse situation of The Newbattle, (1885) 10 P. D. 33, 54 L. J. P. 16,
discussed supra, note 48. Plaintiffs sued the owners of The Neptune for
collision. A counterclaim was filed. Plaintiffs thereupon gave bail, and
asked for an order against defendants to give likewise bail. The French
Government claimed to be the owner of the vessel and to employ her in
war service. The court held, that it could neither order bail nor stay
defendant's counterclaim until bail was filed. Section 34 of the Admiralty
Court Act (which had been applied to a sovereign plaintiff in The Newbattle) was held not applicable to a sovereign counterclaimant, because it
referred only to actions and not to counterclaims. Cf. The Rougemont,
[1893] P. 275, 62 L. J. P. 121.
61[1919]
P. 30, 89 L. J. P. 97 (C.A.).
62
Lord Justice Bankes was not sure whether the vessel was not going
to be restored after the conclusion of the peace, but he thought that The
Parlement Beige covered the instant case, in spite of this fact and in spite
of the employment of the vessel in ordinary trade; Lord Justice Warrington
stated that, whatever the actual use may be to which the ship is put, the
evidence showed that it was state property and destined to public use; and
Lord Justice Scrutton drew the logical consequences from Lord Eshers'
rule of indirectly impleading, and declared that as the arrest of any kind of
governmental property would constitute impleading the foreign sovereign,
it could not be permitted.
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the immunity, the nature of it was determined in the next three
cases, The Tervaete, The Shvan Arrow and The Meandros.
The case of The Tervaete63 involved a vessel which had been
surrendered by Germany to the Allies under the Treaty of
Versailles, and had been allotted to the Belgian Government.
While employed by it, she had collided with the plaintiff's boat.
Thereafter she had been transferred to a private corporation.
The plaintiffs tried to enforce a maritime lien for the collision
by a suit in rem; the defendant owners moved to set aside the
writ. The Admiralty Division held that the immunity of foreign
state vessels was of merely procedural character, and that consequently a lien could attach while the ship was operated by the
foreign government, and be enforced when it passed into private
hands. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision. 4 The three
judges held (for various reasons) that a maritime lien could not
attach upon a vessel in the hands of a foreign sovereign, and
therefore the successor acquired her free from such encumbrance.0 5
In the case of The Sylvan Arrow this principle was applied
to requisitioned ships, and it was decided that a maritime lien could
not he enforced against a private vessel for a collision occurring
while the same was under requisition by a foreign government,
even after her return to the owner. The litigation arose out of a
collision of plaintiff's boat with an American oil tanker which
then had been under a "Requisition Charter" to the American
Government but meanwhile had been restored. The court held in
the first place" that the question was not one of jurisdiction but
one of liability, and second, 7 that no liability could be enforced
against the vessel, as the owners were not responsible for acts
63[1922] P. 197, 91 L. J. P. 151.
64[1922] P. 259, 91 L. J. P. 213.
GGLord Justice Bankes intimated that in a case of a lien which had
attached while the ship was privately owned and which later became
unenforceable when the ship passed into the hands of the government,
enforceability might be revived after her return into private hands. But he
thought that a lien could not attach for the first time while the boat was
used by the government, in the first place, because it was only of procedural
character, and second, because such dormant lien would decrease the value
of the vessel in the hand of the foreign sovereign. Lord Justice Scrutton
adopted a similar reasoning. Lord Atkin based his decision exclusively on
the purely procedural character of the lien. "A right which can only be
expressed as a right to take proceedings seems to me to be denied where
the right to take proceedings is denied." He did not accept the reason that
it should
be denied because it would impair the value.
60
The Sylvan Arrow, [1923] P. 14, 92 L. J. P. 23: motion by owners
to set aside writ denied.
67[1923] P. 220, 92 L. J. P. 119.
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done by the American Government, which acquired the exclusive
control of the vessel not by an ordinary commercial charter but
by compulsory surrender. The case of The Ticonderoga!8 (where a
lien was enforced against a boat for a collision occurring while
it was under a charter to the French Government) was distinguished because "in that case it does not appear that the master
or the crew were appointed or paid by the charterers.0D
The case of The Meandros0 finally gave the Admiralty Division an opportunity to elaborate a further refinement in regard to
the status of requisitioned vessels. There a privately owned Greek
ship had been requisitioned by the Greek Government during the
war between Greece and Turkey and had stranded while under
requisition. The plaintiffs' salvage ship had saved the vessel from
total loss. Plaintiffs arrested the vessel and began an action in
rem for salvage services after her return to the owners. The
owners denied liability because the vessel was under requisition
while the salvage services were rendered. The court awarded
£2500 to the plaintiffs. Sir Henry Duke pointed out that it was
true that "the possession of the vessel and the control of her" had
passed from the owners during the requisition but that this did
not relieve the owners from liability for salvage, as the service
was beneficial to the owners. He distinguished the case of The
Tervaete and "other well known cases" 71 (including probably The
Sylvan Arrow which was cited by counsel for defendants) as
involving liability for acts of the crew and not liability for beneficial services rendered by third persons. The court did not even
discuss the problem by which the Court of Appeals had been
troubled somewhat in The Tervaete,72 viz. how a lien for salvage
could be enforced against the vessel if it could not be enforced at
the time when the services were rendered. As a matter of fact the
court did not pay any attention to the fact that the action was
brought in rem and not merely in personam. But although English
admiralty law knows of actions in rem against a vessel which are not
68(1851) Swabey 215.
69[1923] P. 220, 227, 92 L. J. P. 119, 121. It may be noted that the
decision which is a logical result of the position taken in The Tervaete is
of course, inconsistent with the intimation of Mr. Justice Hill in The
Koursk, mentioned supra, note 54, that the lien attached and could later
be enforced, but is in harmony with The Broadmayne, [1916] P. 64, 85
L. J. P. 153, where no intimation as to the liability of the owners was
made, and with The Messicano, (1916) 32 Times L. Rep. 519, where the
collision had occurred before the requisition.
70[1925] P. 61, 94 L. J.P. 37.
7'The Meandros, [1925] P. 61, 68, 94 L. J.P. 37, 41.
72
The Tervaete, [1922], 91 L. J.P. 213.
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based upon a maritime lien, 3 and the decision could be explained on
that ground7 4 it seems to stand for the proposition that a maritime lien may attach against a privately owned vessel even though
the same is at that time in governmental control, provided that
the owners' liability, at least with respect to the vessel 75 is not
excluded by reason of the fact that the ship was compulsorily
surrendered to a foreign government and the crew controlled by
the latter.
(b). CAsEs INVOLvING CLAIMS FOR RESToRATIoN.-The remaining group of cases decided after the world war deals not with
the question of enforcing liability, but with the possibility of regaining possession, by means of possessory libel in English courts,76 of
vessels taken by foreign governments. The issue arose first in
the case of The Gagara. There the West Russian Steamship
Company sued out a writ in rem and a warrant of arrest against
the steamship Gagara, claiming possession of the same. The
Esthonian Government appeared under protest and moved to
set the writ aside. Plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners
of the vessel, that she had been seized by the Bolshevists and
later captured by the Esthonians. The Esthonian Government filed
an affidavit to the effect that the vessel was condemned as a
prize by a governmental decree and used for war purposes. Mr.
Justice Hill inquired at the foreign office about the status of the
Esthonian Government. As a result of the answer he set aside
the writ.7 7 On appeal his judgment was affirmed.78 Lord Justice
Bankes, writing the opinion, quoted with approval from the judgment below that the court had no jurisdiction because the
Esthonian Government was in actual possession, and stated that
73

For instance actions for necessaries or towage, see 1 Halsbury's Laws
Admiralty, p. 89 footnotes i and k, p. 90
footnote
q.
7
'The owners, having an interest in the preservation of the vessel
according to the decision, are personally liable for salvage by virtue of a
settled rule of English maritime law. Thus the action in rem might have
been given by the court for the enforcement of this liability without the
assumption of a maritime lien.
-In English law it is not without doubt whether a maritime lien can
e.xist without personal liability of the owner for the claim which is secured
by the lien. Cf. Judge Hill's discussion of that problem in The Sylvan
Arrow, [1923] P. 220, 224-228, 92 L. J. P. 119, 121.
7
13Admiralty jurisdiction extended traditionally to possessory claims
but not to questions of title. Since 1840 the High Court of Admiralty
was, however, also competent to decide the issue of title upon which the
right to possession is based. 1 Halsbury's Laws of England, (2d ed. 1931)
Admiralty, 84 footnote b.
77(1919)
35 Times L. Rep. 243.
7
&The Gagara, [1919] P. 95, 88 L. J. P. 101.

of England, (2d ed. 1931)
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the ship was used by it for public purposes. Three weeks later
the same issue came up before Mr. Justice Hill in the cases of
The Annette and The Dora.-, Here two Esthonian subjects sued
in rem for the possession of their ships which, they claimed, had
been taken away from them by the Provisional Government of
Northern Russia and transferred to the Polar Star Association,
a co-operative labor association, for the purpose of trading.
Counsel appearing under protest for the Provisional Government, the master and a person designated as manager, moved
to set the writ aside. On inquiry by Mr. Justice Hill the Foreign
Office stated the Government of Northern Russia was not formally recognized. Thereupon the motions were dismissed. The
decision was based on two alternative grounds, namely (a) that
the Government was not recognized and therefore not entitled
to immunity, and (b) that even if it were a sovereign government it had parted with the possession and therefore was not impleaded in this suit. 80 This emphasis on the possession was in a
certain way a new development.
The last case to be mentioned in this connection is The Jupiter.
It occupied the courts several times in different stages. The facts
were the following. The Jupiter had originally belonged to a fleet
owned by a Russian corporation, known for short as "Ropit."
The ships were registered at Odessa. The corporation was dissolved and expropriated by the famous Soviet decrees, but before
the Soviets took possession of Odessa the vessel left the port. It
went to France and stayed there during September. In France
some persons carried on the business of the Ropit with its French
assets. One Jacob Lpine was appointed master. He received
his orders and salary from the management, which was later
placed by French court orders under the direction of three administrators. In 1924, while the ship was in England, and after
the English recognition of the U. S. S. R. the master handed
the ships paper over to the representatives of the U. S. S. R.
At that moment the French managers issued a writ in rem
(without arrest), claiming possession of the Jupiter. The Soviet
79The Annette; The Dora, [1919], P. 105, 88 L. J. P. 107 (Adm.).
of p. 111: "But even if I were satisfied that the Provisional
Government of Northern Russia was a sovereign state, I should then have
to consider whether the government is in possession of this vessel. If it is
not in possession, the court interferes with no sovereign right of the
government by arresting the vessel, nor does it, by arresting the vessel,
compel the government to submit to the jurisdiction or to abandon its
possession."
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Government intervened and moved to set aside the writ because
they were the owners of the vessel. Mr. Justice Hill granted the
motion. s' He stated that, as the ship was of Russian registry, he
was bound by the foreign government's allegation concerning the
property. The question of the effect of the nationalization decree
was not material. "Nor . . . is it material to consider whether

the master, who was custodian for the plaintiffs rightfully or
effectively transferred possession to the Union."8' 2 It is noteworthy then that in this case he gave much less weight to the
question of possession than he had done in The Annette and The
Dora. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.8 3 The three
judges writing the opinions likewise did not lay any stress on the
fact that the ship was in the actual possession of the U. S. S. R.,
but emphasized rather that any writ in rem by its very nature
impleaded the foreign government.8 4
The vessel was later sold through a British company to an
Italian corporation. Thereupon the plaintiffs tried their luck
again. The Italian corporation moved to set aside the writ because of lack of jurisdiction, and on other grounds. The Admiralty
Division s c denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed
this decision, particularly stating that the U. S. S. R. was no
longer impleaded.86 The case therefore was finally tried upon the
merits. The Admiralty Division rendered judgment for the
plaintiffs. 87 Mr. Justice Hill stated that by virtue of the French
court orders, of which one was made while the ship was in
81(1924) 40 Times L. Rep. 673 (Adm.).
s Italics ours. The further statement is likewise worth quoting. "Mr.
Jowitt contended that the plaintiffs for the purposes of this action were
not concerned with the property in the ship-they only wanted to be put
in actual possession of the ship of which they had never lost the right to
possession. But they are seeking an order for possession by a writ in rem,
a proceeding against the property. . . ." (1924) 40 Times L. Rep. 673, 676.
83[1924]
P. 236, 93 L. J. P. 156.
84Lord Justice Bankes states: "It seems to me that the necessary
result of these proceedings is to call upon the Soviet Government to assert
its title, and then have the question of the ownership or the right to possession of this vessel, litigated in the courts of this country." Lord Justice
Scrutton likewise stated that in a writ in rem the claim by the foreign
government of having a right sufficed to deprive the court of jurisdiction.
"It appears to me without going any further, without investigating whether
the claim is good or bad, that the court, on having that statement made
to it, must decline jurisdiction." Lord Atkin, finally, announced: "I decide
it on the sole ground that this process by the very nature of it is an
attempt to implead the Russian Soviet Government, and the court has no
jurisdiction to do that."
8r(1925) 21 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 61.
8[1925] P. 69, 94 L. J. P. 59, 78: "The Russian Government do not
claim87at the moment to be the owners or to have the right of possession."
The Jupiter III, [1927] P. 122, 96 L. J. P. 62 (Adm.).
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France, the French administrator had the right to possession
and, as the master was a mere custodian only,88 had actual possession too. Consequently the surrender of the boat by the master
to the Soviet authorities was prima facie wrongful, and the plaintiffs were entitled to restoration, unless the Italian company could
show that the U. S. S. R. had a superior title. 9 As the Russian
decrees did not have the effect of transferring property outside
Russian territory to the U. S. S. R. the defendant failed to do
so, and therefore the plaintiffs were entitled to restitution. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on the grounds of the
court below.90
If we sum up the law as laid down by these nineteen English 9'
cases the following picture seems to result:
"The Jupiter III, [1927] P. 122, 131, 96 L. J. P. 62, "In my judgment,
Captain L~pine never was in possession of the Jupiter nor had he at any
time the right to possession. He was a custodian merely. The person for
whom
he was custodian was in actual possession."
89
The Jupiter III, [1927] P. 122, 135, 96 L. J. P. 62: "The result of
these considerations is that in March, 1924, when L~pine allowed the
U. S. S. R. to take possession of the ship, M. Bourgeois was in actual
possession and had the right to possession. L~pine may have acted as a
loyal subject of the U. S. S. R. but he betrayed his trust to his employers.

Prima facie the act of L~pine was wrongful. Prima facie M. Bourgeois,
who had possession in fact and law, was wrongfully deprived of possession
in fact. Prima facie M. Bourgeois is entitled to recover possession. His
right does not depend merely upon a right to sue given by the French
decrees. It depends upon possession and right to possession, in England,
and wrongful dispossession in England .... Judgment must be pronounced
in his favour, unless the Cantiere Olivo Societa Anonima can show that
the U. S. S. R., who sold the ship to them, had superior title.

.

. " See

further p. 153: "The result is that, in my judgment, M. Bourgeois in
March 1924, was wrongfully deprived of possession, and that no one has
established
title superior to that of M. Bourgeois."
90
The Jupiter III [1927] P. 250, 97 L. J.P. 33 (C.A.).
91In addition to these English cases, the four cases decided in other
parts of the British Empire, mentioned supra note 28, case might be
considered. In The Eolo, [1918] 2 Irish Rep. Y. B. Div. 78 salvage was
claimed against a privately owned ship which sailed under the orders of
the Italian Ministry of the Marine, carrying war materials and manned by
Italian gunners. On the Italian claim to immunity the ship was discharged.
The court thought that it need not decide whether a mere claim to immunity
would suffice, as there was ample evidence to support it. In Owners of
S. S. Victoria v. Owners of S. S. Quillwark, [1922] Scots Law Times
Reports 68, The Outer House of the Court of Sessions of Scotland held
that a vessel owned by the United States and operated by the United States
Shipping Board was not subject to "arrestment," for collision, although at
the time of the accident and the suit she was "employed in ordinary trading
voyages carrying cargoes for private individuals." In Brown v. S. S.
Indo-chine, (1922) 21 Can. Exch. Rep. 406 the Quebec Admiralty Court
dismissed a suit in rem for collision against a vessel which belonged to
the Government of French Indo-China; the vessel had begun its voyage
carrying convicts to Guiana, but at the time of the collision the vessel was
under a charter party to proceed to Montreal for the purpose of taking a
cargo on board destined for France, operated, however, by the governmental
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A. No warrant for arrest will be issued against any vessel
which is in the actual service (whether by virtue of ownership
or under time-charter or requisition) of a recognized foreign
government.
B. As far as the writ in rem is concerned claims for liability
and possessory claims must be distinguished.
1. Where plaintiff sues in rem to establish liability,
(a) The writ will be dismissed, if a recognized foreign
government is in possession and claims ownership; it is not clear
whether mere claim of ownership without possession suffices, as
for instance 'where the ship is chartered under a bare-boat charter
to a private person and causes a collision or needs salvaging during this employment.
(b) The writ will not be dismissed, if the foreign government does not claim ownership, even though it is in the actual
possession of the ship at the time the suit is brought. The private
owner will, however, not be held liable for tort claims such as
collision based on acts by the crew which happened while the
boat was owned or compulsorily employed and controlled by a
foreign government. But he is liable for quasi-contractual claims
such as for salvage and apparently for all claims based on occurrences which happened either while the ship was used by him prior
to the government's employment, or while it was used by another
private owner prior to the governmental ownership, or while it was
employed by the foreign government under a commercial time
charter, particularly without appointment of a new crew.
2. Where the plaintiff sties for possession the writ will be
dismissed, if a foreign recognized government claims the right
to possession and is in the actual possession of the vessel, regardless of whether possesion was rightfully or wrongfully obtained. There are dicta which seem to state that even a mere
claim of ownership and right to possession without actual possession might suffice to a dismissal. But when the foreign government transfers its alleged title and possession or only possession, suit will lie against the grantee; and if the plaintiff proves
wrongful dispossession the defendant must establish superior title
or will be condemned.
crew. In De Howorth v. The S. S. India, South African Law Reports
[1921J Cape Prov. Div. 451 the Supreme Court of South Africa refused
to permit an attachment of The India which was a vessel owned by
Portugal, operated by the Transportes Maritimos do Estado for trading
and postal purposes and occasionally for military purposes.
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B.

THE

CASE OF THE CRISTINA AND ITS SUCCESSORS

The rules of law thus established by the decisions of the Admiralty Division and the Court of Appeal mentioned in the previous section had to undergo their baptism of fire, when the House
of Lords occupied itself for the first time with the claim to sovereign immunity by a foreign vessel in the case of The Cristina"'
in 1938. The facts were the following." The Cristina was a vessel
registered at Bilbao. She belonged to a Spanish corporation, which
at the time of the suit carried on its business in -Marseilles and
sailed its ships from Marseilles. The Cristina was on a trip outside the Spanish territorial waters, when on June 28th, 1937, the
president of the Republic of Spain signed a decree at Valencia
requisitioning all vessels registered at Bilbao. Without returning into Spanish waters the vessel reached Cardiff on July 8th
of 1938. The Spanish consul at Cardiff to whom the captain presented himself on July 9th gave order to hand over the ship's
papers for endorsement that the ship had been taken over by the
Spanish Government. On the captain's refusal the consul dismissed him and all officers hostile to the government. The consul
entered the boat on July 14th in the absence of the old captain,
opened his cabin by force, and appointed a new captain and chief
officer who held the ship at the government's disposal. Thereupon
the owner sued out a writ of possession and a warrant for arrest.
The Spanish Government moved to set aside the writ and all subsequent proceedings. M\1r. Justice Bucknill set the writ aside." '
The Court of Appeal affirmed this decision. All three lords justices 9l pointed out that the Spanish Government had actual possession, and could therefore not be ousted by an English court
92[1938]

A. C. 485, 107 L. J.P. 1.

93Cf. the statement of the case by Lord Wright in the House of Lords

Decision, [1938] A. C. 485, 498, 107 L. J. P. 1,7,and by Lord Justice
Greer in the Court of Appeal Decision, (1937) 59 Lloyds List Law Rep. 49.
4. .. "The Spanish Government which has taken this action in the
matter is an independent sovereign state recognized by this country and
it is so admitted by the owners of the ship, and that being so I think it is
impossible for this court to exercise jurisdiction over The Cristina, a ship
which they-the Spanish Government-claim to have requisitioned, to have
a right of possession in, and to have taken such steps as were available to
the Government actually to be in possession of her, and I think that this
writ should be set aside." (1937) 59 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 1 at 5.
95
Lord Justice Greer, Lord Justice Slesser and Lord Justice Scott,
(1937) 59 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 47. Lord Justice Greer stated: "I cannot
help thinking that the time has come when it is desirable that there should
be some revision as to when and in what circumstances effect will be given
to the usual rule that a foreign Government cannot be impleaded in this
country." (P. 51).
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regardless of how such possession was obtained. From this order
an appeal was brought to the House of Lords. All five Lords
giving an opinion (i.e. Lord Atkin, Lord Thankerton, Lord MacMillan, Lord Wright and Lord Maugham) agreed that the appeal should be dismissed. But even though they all agreed in the
decision reached, their reasoning shows some interesting and perhaps important dissension about the ramifications of the principle of sovereign immunity.
Lord Atkin who delivered the first opinion started out with
"two propositions of international law engrafted into our domestic law ;" namely, first "that the courts of a country will not
implead a foreign sovereign," and second "that they will not
by their process, whether the sovereign is a party to the proceedings or not, seize or detain property which is his or of which he
is in possession or control." With respect to the latter principle
he assumed that it was "well settled" in English law that it extended to property used for commercial purposes and to personal private property. He stated "that in a simple case of a writ
in rein issued by our Admiralty Court in a claim for collision
damage against the owners of a public ship of a sovereign state
in which the ship is arrested, both principles are broken,"'9 and
propounded the view that likewise in the instant case of a suit in
rem for the recovery of possession both these principles were contravened. The first one was violated, he explained, because by the
very fact that the writ was directed against all persons claiming
an interest the Spanish Government was directly8 impleaded, and
this not only in fact but according to the intent of the parties ;99
the
second principle was even more clearly violated because the arrest
was undoubtedly within the international prohibition. Therefore
",This means, as he defined more closely, that "they will not by their
process make the foreign sovereign against his will a party to legal
proceedings, whether the proceedings involve process against his person or
seek to recover from him specific property or damages." [1938] A. C. 485,
490, 107 L. J. P. 1, 3.
(1[1938] A. C. 485, 491, 107 L. J.P. 1, 3.
1-"When the plaintiffs issued a writ in which they constituted as
defendants the steamship or vessel Cristina and all persons claiming an
interest therein .. .they were directly impleading the Spanish Government,
whom they knew to be the only persons interested in The Cristina other
than themselves and from whom they desired that possession should be
taken after it was adjudged to them." [1938] A. C. 485, 491, 107 L. J. P.
1, 4.
09"I have no doubt not only that the government were in fact impleaded
but were intended by the plaintiff to be impleaded." [19381 A. C. 485, 492.

107 L. J.P. 1, 4.
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no further point needed to be discussed.2- Lord Wright took
much the same view.101
Similarly Lord Atkin stated that a foreign state could neither
be impleaded nor its control or possession of a vessel be interfered with by the courts of another state, both rules flowing
from the immunity of one state from the jurisdiction of another
state; and that both rules demanded the dismissal of the appeal
in the instant case. 10 2 He likewise pointed out that a writ in rem
impleaded the foreign state directly,0 3 particularly in the instant
case where a possessory action was brought and the foreign
state had actual possession. 10 4 He added cautiously:

"It is unnecessary here to consider whether the court would
act conclusively on a bare assertion by the government that the
vessel is in its possession. I should hesitate as at present advised
so to hold, but the respondent here has established the necessary
facts by evidence."105

The mode by which the foreign government obtained possession
was, according to him, not material. His Lordship then justified
the decision also on the strength of the second rule that the courts
could not interfere with the property of a foreign sovereign. He
made the remarkable comment
"The rule is not limited to ownership. It applies to cases where
what the government has is a lesser interest, which may be not
merely not proprietary but not even possessory."'100
This immunity attaches "even in respect of conduct in breach
of the municipal law."'107 The control actually gained in the instant
case sufficed to invest the government with the immunity. Hc
thought further that the present case, because of the purpose for
00
"In the present case I find it unnecessary to decide many of the
interesting points raised in the arguments for the appellants, as to whether
the ship was rightly in the possession of the government, what was the
exterritorial effect of the Spanish decree, what implied restrictions in
different circumstances might be attached to sovereign immunity, when if
ever, the assertion of the sovereign as to his property or possession is
conclusive." [1938] A. C. 485, 493, 107 L. J. P. 1, 4.
A. C. 485, 498, 107 L. J. P. 1, 7.
101[1938]
' 02 "In my judgment both contentions are well founded, and the order
of the Courts below may be sustained on either ground." [1938] A. C. 485,
502, 107 L. J. P. 1, 9.
aos"It may be said that it is indirectly impleaded, but I incline to
think that it is more correct to say that it is directly impleaded." [1938]
A. C. 485, 505, 107 L. 3. P. 1, 11.
' 04"The crucial fact in this connection is simply that the de facto
possession was enjoyed by the Spanish Government." [19381 A. C. 485,
505, (1938) 107 L. J.P. 1, 11.
105[1938] A. C. 485, 506, 107 L. 3. P. 1, 11.
106[1938] A. C. 485, 507, 107 L. J. P. 1, 11.
107[1938] A. C. 485, 509, 107 L. 3. P. 1, 12.
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which the vessel was requisitioned, needed no decision on the question whether a mere trading vessel enjoyed the same immunity;
but he added "as at present advised I am of opinion that these
decisions ...of the Court of Appeal correctly state the English
law on this point."'01
The other three Lords struck a somewhat different tune.
Lord Thankerton agreed with Lord Atkin "that in the present
case not only were the Spanish Government in fact impleaded,
but they were intended to be so impleaded."''1 9 He agreed also
with Lord Atkin's view that the doctrine of immunity of the
property of a foreign sovereign state dedicated to public uses included the case of actual possession for public use. But he expressed "some doubt whether the proposition that the foreign
sovereign state cannot be impleaded is an absolute one; the real
criterion being the nature of the remedy sought."" 0 He thought
that The Parlement Beige did not necessarily lead to this result,
and explicitly reserved therefor the liberty "to reconsider the decision of The Porto Alexandre."" , It is important, furthermore,
that he felt it necessary to point out specifically that the Spanish
Government had obtained possession "without a breach of the
2
peace."1
Lord Macmillan agreed with Lord Thankerton and emphasized:
"I confess that I should hesitate to lay down that it is part
of the law of England that an ordinary trading vessel is immune
from civil process within this realm by reason merely of the fact
that it is owned by a foreign state."'
Lord Maugham finally took the view most opposite to Lord
Atkin. His arguments are most interesting, but do not appear to
be entirely consistent. Right at the outset he emphasized (like
Lord Thankerton) that the possession of The Cristina was obtained without breach of the peace."14 Then, after setting out the
claims made by the Spanish Government he felt it necessary to
caution immediately against any extreme demands.
"It seems to me that the claim by the Spanish Government
for immunity from any form of process in this country may extend to cases where possession of ships or other chattels had
10'[19381 A. C. 485, 512, 107 L. J. P. 1, 14.
109[19381 A. C. 485, 493, 107 L. J.P. 1, 5.
110[1938] A. C. 485, 494, 107 L. J. P. 1, 5.
111[19381 A. C. 485, 496, 107 L. J.P. 1, 6.
12[19381 A. C. 485, 493, 107 L. J.P. 1, 5.
113[1938] A. C. 485, 498, 107 L. J.P. 1, 7.
114[19381 A. C. 485, 514, 107 L. J.P. 1, 15.
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been seized in this country without any shadow of right, and
also to cases where maritime liens were sought to be enforced
by actions in rem against vessels belonging to a foreign government and employed in the ordinary operations of commerce.
For my part I think such a claim ought to be scrutinized with
the greatest of care." 1-5
He distinguished thereupon between personal immunity and immunity as regards property. In the latter case a mere assertion of
title by a foreign government would not impart any immunity
to the property in the hands of third persons "except in such
cases as ships of war or other notoriously public vessels or other
public property belonging to the state." Only if it was itself,
rightly or wrongly, in possession thereof, could no claim regarding it be brought. 116 He then specifically turned to the question of ships lying in British waters and being in the possession
of a foreign government. He proceeded first to explain The Parlement Belge as granting immunity only if such immunity was one
universally recognized in foreign countries, and pointed out that
this vital point was overlooked in The Porto Alexandre.117 He

then eliminated the objection based on the fact that the writ in
rem impleads the 'foreign government; he conceded this, but
pointed out that no more than a remedy against the res could be
obtained. In The Cristina Case, however, he was in favor of granting immunity because the ship was going to be used for public
purposes.
It is very difficult to deduce from these five opinions any definite predictions for the scope of foreign immunity. All that the
House of Lords decided was that the court had no power to take
a ship from the possession of a recognized foreign 'government
which had obtained such possession for public purposes and without breach of the peace. But the opinions of at least three of the
Lords show that the immunity of purely commercial vessels has
become doubtful, and all five seem to agree that jurisdictional
immunity of the vessel requires at least something more than a
mere claim, some sort of actual use. In so far the principle of
115[1938] A. C. 485, 515,

L. J. P. 1, 15.
116[19381 A. C. 485, 515, 107
516, 107 L. J. P. 1, 17. Consequently if the
government is in possession then no suit can be brought, even though it
had seized the property "without shadow of right." Is this consistent with
his statement quoted in the text to note 115?
:11[19381 A. C. 485, 519, 107 L. J. P. 1, 17, 18. See particularly his
statement: "Almost every line of the judgment [in The Parlement Bege]
would have been otiose, if the view of the court had been that all ships
belonging to a foreign government even if used purely for commerce were
entitled to immunity."

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN VESSELS

The Annette and The Dora seems to have won over that of The
Parlement Belge.
The next case in the field was the case of The Arraiz.118 This
ship was originally in a similar position to The Cristina, viz.,
requisitioned and taken over by the loyalist Spanish Government
and arrested by her owners."' She was released upon the basis
of the decision of the House of Lords in The Cristina Case, but
before she left England she was arrested again, this time by the
Franco Government, which claimed possession of the boat under
a requisition decree of March 2d, 1938. The writ was explicitly
directed only against the ship and the master, in order to get
around the criticism of Lord Atkin in The Cristina Case against
interpleading "all parties interested." The Admiralty Division
held, however, that the Republican Government, being "in fact in
possession," was nevertheless directly impleaded, and ordered
the release. It is worth while to note that the court was not
troubled by the question, whether a government which was recognized only as de facto government could sue out a writ at all in
an English court. The same situation'2 came up again in the
case of El Neptuno.'21 Counsel tried to distinguish the case because the Republican Government had not made any use of the
vessel since its first release and only vessels put to active public
use enjoyed the immunity. The court refused, however, to accept
this argument.
The converse situation presented itself in the case of The
Arantzazu Mendi.22 There the Republican Government sued
for possession of a vessel, and the Nationalist Government claimed
immunity. The facts deserve more detailed attention. The
vessel had left Spain on May 1st, 1937. On June 28th the Republican Government requisitioned the ship. On August 11th, 1937,
118(1938) 61 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 39. (Adm.).
11oThe Cristina and other vessels, (1937) 59 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 1.
(Adm.). Another case dealing with a similar set of facts except that the
requisition took place in Spain, is The Rita Garcia, (1937) 59 Lloyd's
List Law Rep. 140 (Adm.).
120I. e. re-arrest by the Nationalist Government of a vessel in the
hands of the Loyalist Government which was released from the first arrest
by private persons (in the instant case by the crew for wages) on the
qtrength of the decision in The Cristina Case.
"-"(193S) 62 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 7. (Adm.). (The court's appeal
to the proverbial courtesy of the Spaniards for relief of the British courts
from being burdened with their duties is worth reading.)
122[19381 P. 233, 107 L. J. P. 128 (Adm.); [1939] P. 39, 108 L. J. P.
2 (C.A.) ; [19391 A. C. 256, 108 L. J. P. 55. The Court of Appeal entered
a similar order in The Alu Mendi, (1938) 62 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 64.
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The Arantzazu Mendi arrived in England and was arrested by
her owners on August 24th, 1937. The Republican Government
appeared under protest. The owners discontinued their suit on
April 12th, 1938, but the arrest was not raised because of failure
to pay the costs for the detention. On March 23d the Republican Government served a notice of requisition upon the owners,
and on April 5th, 1938, the Nationalist Government served a
similar notice under a decree of March 2d, 1938, upon the master,
who accepted it and undertook to hold the vessel for the Nationalist Government. On the same date the owners were served with a
similar notice, and on April 13th the managing director of the
owners declared notarially to submit to the requisition. Thereupon the Republican Government issued a writ "to have possession adjudged to them," and arrested the boat. The Franco
Government claimed immunity. The Admiralty Division set the
writ and arrest aside after having inquired at the Foreign Office
about the status of the Nationalist Government, and having received the information that "His Majesty's Government recognized the Nationalist Government as a government which at
present exercised de facto administrative control over the larger
portion of Spain." Mr. Justice Bucknill took the view that a
government in such a position as described in the letter by the
foreign office was entitled to sovereign immunity; that the Nationalist Government had done all it could do legally to obtain
possession, considering that the ship was under arrest, and that
it had in fact got a "limited possession;" that the writ-apart
from being irregular in its form-therefore impleaded the Nationalist Government. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.
Their Lordships Slesser, Finlay and Goddard agreed that the
Nationalist Government had a status which entitled it to sovereign
immunity, and that it could claim it in regard to the vessel, as
it had a certain interest in the boat by virtue of the acceptance of
the requisition by the master and the owners, even though it was
technically not possession. 123 The House of Lords affirmed this de' 23 Lord Justice Slesser pointed out that the position of the Nationalist
Government amounted to more than a mere claim, but was a lesser interest
than ownership held for their benefit by master and owner; Lord Justice
Finlay stated that there was an interest in the Spanish Nationalist Government being not a right of possession, but a proprietary right, and that it
was therefore impleaded; Lord Justice Goddard likewise emphasized that
the fact that the master and owner had consented to the requisition raised
the claim of the Nationalist Government above the level of a bare assertion
of right or mere claim, and therefore should not be affected by any exercise
of jurisdiction. The Arantzazu Mendi; [1939] P. 39, 108 L. J. P. 2.
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Lord Atkin took pains, however, to point
cision in its turnY.
out specifically that the arrest gave the marshal only custody and
the National Government had possession at the material date."'2
Possession, then, was treated as a decisive, if not indispensable,
factor for the claims of immunity in possessory actions. This
led however to the result that the courts, even though they had
declared that the question how possession was obtained was immaterial, at least as long as no breach of the peace was involved,
could not help being dragged into the struggle for control. This
happened in the case of The Abodi Mendi.1 26 The Abodi Mendi
was a Spanish ship lying in England with a crew of ten persons
under a master, named Aguirre. On April 13th, 1938, the Republican Government issued a writ in rem for possession of the vessel
which it had requisitioned, alleging that the old master had been
dismissed by them and a new master appointed, the old master
remaining on board. The Nationalist Government intervened.
On October 14th, 1938, the plaintiffs asked to discontinue the
arrest, because they had obtained possession of the vessel. The
owners and the Nationalist Government consented. On October
15th, 1938, however, the crew refused Captain Aguirre, who had
left the ship for a walk, access to the boat. Thereupon the owners
withdrew their consent to the release and asked for re-instatement
of the captain. The Admiralty Division refused to order reinstatement of the master, but refused also to grant a release
from the arrest until the House of Lords had spoken in the case
of The Arantcaz~u Mie'odi. The Court of Appeal reversed this
decision. Lord Justice Scott stated that the action of the crew
was a contempt of court which prejudiced the actual position of
the defendant owner. The court ordered therefore that the ship
should be released upon an affidavit that Captain Aguirre had

124[1939] A. C. 256, 103 L. J. P. 55. The position of the House of

Lords with regard to the legal status of governments recognized merely
as de facto governments is commented upon by Professor Briggs in De
Facto and De Jure Recognition: The Arantzazu Mendi, (1939) 33 Am. 3.
Int. L. 6S9, and by Professor Lauterpacht in Recognition of Insurgents
as a de Facto Government, (1939) 3 Modem L. Rev. 1.
125[1939] A. C. 256, 265, 266, 108 L. J. P. 55, 58. See also his statement: "As in my opinion, there is no doubt that the Nationalist Government
was in fact in possession of the ship, the question does not arise that was
discussed in The Cristina, whether on a writ framed in the ordinary form
of a writ in rem and not having specific defendants the mere fact that a

foreign sovereign State was claiming possession or to be entitled to possession
was sufficient to show that the State was impleaded without proof that the
claim was rightly or reasonably made." At p. 263.
126[1939] P. 178, 180, 62 Lloyd's List Law Rep. 254 (Adm.) ; [1939]
P. 178. 188, 108 L. 3. P. 60 (C.A.).
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been permitted to return on board and was on board, and granted
the liberty to execute this release to both the plaintiffs and defendant owners.
The last case to be mentioned is The Amazone.' 27 It involved
a domestic controversy about the ownership of a yacht between
a Belgian assistant military attach6 and his wife. The wife issued
a writ in rem and the husband asked to set the writ aside, invoking
his diplomatic immunity. The court found that he was in possession and, under reference to the case of The Cristina, granted the
motion.
The upshot of these cases does not add much to The Cristina
Case. They all involved possessory claims. In all cases except
in The Abodi Mendi, it was finally found that the defendant who
claimed and obtained immunity in fact had possession. The only
new feature is that the immunity rules are applicable also between contesting governments, provided that either of them is
recognized, at least as a de facto government. The House of
Lords left the question of mere claims to possession or ownership explicitly undecided. But one might discern among the
lower courts a tendency in harmony with certain statements by
some members of. the House of Lords to the effect that at least
in possessory actions a bare assertion would not suffice and that
the showing of a certain power of direction over the vessel is
necessary. 125 Thus an intermediate position between the statements in The Annette and The Dora on one side and The Parlement Beige on the other side seems to be the final result. Whether
this will be true also in respect to suits in rem for the enforcement of money claims is hard to predict. The case of The Abodi
Mendi shows that even in that way the courts cannot completely
stay out of the intricate field of foreign relations.
III.

THE AMERICAN CASES

A. THE DECISIONS PRIOR TO TiE NAVEXAR
American law has developed on somewhat simpler lines than
English law.
127[1939] P. 322, 108 L. J. P. 150.
"5sProfessor Lauterpacht in his above mentioned article objects to

these solutions, which make the decisions dependent upon the shifting
accidents of possession: for instance a master may change his allegiance.
But this is exactly what had also happened in The Jupiter. If a breach of
the peace occurred, or a contempt of court, the status quo may be restored
before immunity will be granted. It may be remembered, that such incident
occurred even in the earliest English case, in The Prins Frederik, discussed
supra text to note 29, where the master had ejected the court's custodian.
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(1)

BiRTH OF THE DOCTRINE WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS FOR

first cases (it might
be worthwhile noting) arose as in England in connection with war
vessels, being libels in admiralty against the same either for damages suffered from illegal captures or for restoration of possession.
The oldest case in point is apparently The Cassius."92 Here a libel
was brought in the district court of Pennsylvania against a
French armed corvette, The Cassius, by the owner of an American
vessel because of an alleged illegal capture of his boat. The
captain of The Cassius moved for a writ of prohibition in the
WRONGFUL TAKING AND RESTITUTION.-The

Supreme Court, and this court granted the motion, evidently
without doubt that the French corvette was immune from suit
under the circumstances of the case." 0° The next decision was

the celebrated case of The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.13'
Here the Supreme Court for the first time announced the immunity of foreign public armed vessels in general terms. M'Faddon
and another citizen of the United States had libeled The Exchange,

claiming to be the owners. The attorney of the United States,
at the instance of the executive department, filed a suggestion to
the effect that the ship should be released because it was a public
vessel of the Emperor of France.

The district court dismissed

the libel. The circuit court reversed this decision. Chief Justice
Marshall reversed the circuit court and affirmed the dismissal.

He stated that it was a principle of public law that national ships
of war were exempted from the jurisdiction of other friendly
powers while being in their ports.
The immunity of public armed vessels was extended to private
armed vessels of duly commissioned privateers in the case of
The Invincible." 2 In The Santissima. Trinidad'" Mr. Justice
"'DReported under the name United States v. Richard Peters, (1795)
3 Dall. (U.S.) 121, 1 L. Ed. 535.
130 "And whereas by the said law of nations, and treaties aforesaid,
the vessels of war belonging to the said French Republic . . . cannot and
ought not, to be arrested, seized, attached, or detained, in the ports of
the United States, by process of law, at the suit or instance of individuals
to answer for any capture or captures, seizure or seizures, made on the
high seas, and brought for legal adjudication into the ports of the French
Republic, by the said vessel of war, while belonging to, and acting under
the authority and in the immediate service of the said Republic.... " (1795)
3 Dall. (U.S.) 121, 129, 1 L. Ed. 535. The court thus did not say clearly
whether it was the nature of the vessel or the character of the clahn for
which it was sought to be arrested that was the reason for the absence of
jurisdiction. On the further history of The Cassius see Ketland v. The
Cassius, (Circ. Ct. D. Pennsylvania 1796) 2 Dall. 365, Fed. Cas. 7743,
the note at the end of The Cassius (1795) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 121, 132, 1 L.
Ed. 535 and L'Invincible (1816) 1 Wheaton 238, 252, 4 L. Ed. 80.
133(1812) 7 Cranch (U.S.) 116, 3 L. Ed. 287.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Story had occasion to add two important refinements to these
principles, and further to define their scope. He stated first that
the sovereign immunities were applicable not only to recognized
sovereigns but also to recognized belligerents, 34 and second, that
even though foreign public ships and privateers are immune from
suit for illegal captures on the high seas in violation of American neutrality, this immunity does not apply to the prizes brought
13 5
into the American territory.
(2)
CASES EXTENDING IT TO CLAIMS FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF OTHER LIABLITY.-The immunity was extended to other

claims in rem than those for wrongful capture or restoration of
possession. It must, however, be observed that the law of governmental immunities (relating to vessels as well as to other property)
was developed in the United States mainly with respect to the federal and state governments.

36

The law of sovereign immunity of

132(1816) 1 Wheat. (U.S.) 238, 4 L. Ed. 80 (owners of a captured
private vessel cannot interpose a claim in the prize proceedings against the
capturer, a duly commissioned privateer, if the same is captured by another
power).
133(1822) 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 283, 5 L. Ed. 454 (libel of goods taken
as prize).
14"All the immunities which may be claimed by public ships in our
ports under the law of nations must be considered as equally the right
[belligerent]." (1822) 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 283, 337, 5 L. Ed. 454.
of each
13 5 Mr. Justice Story discussed the cases of The Cassius, The Exchange
and L'Invincible, in the instant case (1822) 7 Wheat. (U.S.) 283, 350-352, 5
L. Ed. 454. With respect to jurisdiction over the captured vessel see also
the earlier case of Talbot v. Janson (1795) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 133, 1 L. Ed. 540.
136See Raymond, Sovereign Immunity in Modern Admiralty Law.
(1931) 9 Tex. L. Rev. 519, 528; Weston, Actions against the Property
of Sovereigns, (1918) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 266. The oldest case in point
is apparently Moitez v. The South Carolina, (Pa. Adm. 1781) Bee 422,
Fed. Cas. 9,697 holding that mariners enlisting on a war vessel belonging
seemingly either to the United States or to a state of the confederation
could not libel the ship for wages. The more important pre-war cases
concerning the immunity of the federal government are: United States v.
Barney, (D. Md. before 1810) 3 Hughes 545, Fed. Cas. 14,525 (lien on
horses for their liverage cannot be enforced against the United States in
respect to mail horses); United States v. Wilder, (C.C. Mass. 1838) 3
Sumner 308, Fed. Cas. 16,694 (lien for general average may be enforced
against a cargo of slop clothing belonging to the federal government while
on board of a private vessel); The Thomas A. Scott, (S.C. N.Y. 1864)
10 L. T. Rep. 726 (United States transport vessel not commissioned in
navy is immune from libel for salvage); Briggs v. Lightboats, (1865) 11
Allen (Mass.) 157 (no attachment to enforce asserted builder's lien
against light boats in the possession of the United States). The Othello,
(E.D. N.Y. 1866) 5 Blatchf. 342, Fed. Cas. 10,611 (libel on bottomry bond
against vessel chartered but not manned by the United States and on
cargo belonging to the United States by capture was upheld against boat
and dismissed against cargo; but see Cartwright v. Othello, (E.D. N.Y.
1866) 1 Benedict 43, Fed. Cas. 248 where lower court refused to vacate
the libel both against boat and cargo on mere motion) ; The Siren, (1868)
7 Wall. (U.S.) 152, 19 L. Ed. 129 (ship in the possession of prize crew
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foreign vessels 137 was nearly put at rest in the ninety years preceding the World War.
Only three cases seem to have arisen in this period. In the
first one, reported under the name of Valley v. Schooner
Liberty,13 it was held that the new Republic of Texas, even before its independence was recognized, could claim immunity for
one of its war vessels which was seized by creditors for supplies
furnished, because Texas possessed belligerent rights.1 3
The
second one was the case of Pizarro v. Mathias 1 0° There it was
held expressly that the immunity of foreign public ships (in the
instant case a Spanish war vessel) was not confined to questions
of title, but extended to all maritime claims. The last one, the
case of Long v. Tampico,14' involved a salvage claim in rem
against The Tampico, which had just been built in the United
States and was designed for Mlexico to be used as a revenue
cutter. The libel was answered by one De Rivera as agent for the
Republic of Mexico, who pleaded to the jurisdiction. The court
might become liable for maritime tort and lien resulting therefrom might
be enforced out of its proceeds) ; The Davis, (1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 15,
19 L. Ed. 875 (cotton belonging to the United States which is delivered
to master of private vessel is subject to salvage lien). Cf. also United
States v. Peters, (1809) 5 Cranch (U.S.) 115, 3 L. Ed. 38 (money held
by treasurer of Pennsylvania was under the circumstances of the case not
in possession of the state and therefore liable to attachment): United
States v. Lee, (1882) 106 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. Ed. 171 (suit
in ejectment possible against officers holding land for the United States,
if sued in private capacity) ; Stanley v. Schwalby, (1893) 147 U. S. 508,
13 Sup. Ct. 418, 37 L. Ed. 259, and (1896) 162 U. S. 255, 16 Sup. Ct. 754,
10 L. Ed. 960: (Action of trespass to try title under Texas law against
officers holding land for the United States cannot be concluded with
judgment for plaintiff, so as to bind the United States claiming adversely).
See further Workman v. New York City, (1900) 179 U. S. 552, 21 Sup.
Ct. 212, 45 L. Ed. 314 (libel in personam possible for injury resulting from
operation of city owned fire boat) ; United States v. Cornell Steamboat Co.,
(1906) 202 U. S. 184, 26 Sup. Ct. 648, 50 L. Ed. 987 (salvage claim under
Tucker Act). As to the modem statutes concerning maritime claims against
the federal government see Robinson, Admiralty Law (1939) 265, 269.
137With respect to property of foreign states other than vessels there
exist a few pre-world war cases, all of which involve attachment suits:
Leavitt v. Dabney, (N.Y. 1868) 37 How. Prac. 264; Hassard v. United
States of Mexico, (N.Y. 1899) 29 Misc. Rep. 511, 61 N. Y. S. 939; Mason
v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada, (1908) 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876.
The first case involving a libel of a cargo belonging to a foreign government arose only during the world war: The Johnson Lighterage No. 24,
(D. N.J. 1916) 231 Fed. 365, where the court upheld a seizure even with
respect to foreign war materials on board of a private vessel.
138(1833) 12 La. 98.
3lOAs the case was decided after recognition of Texas as an independent
state, the court could have more easily relied on the relation back theory;
instead, however, it chose to apply the dictum of The Santissima Trinidad,
quoted supra note 134.
140(S.D. N.Y. 1852) 10 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 97, Fed. Cas. 11, 199.
141(S.D. N.Y. 1883) 16 Fed. 491.
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conceded that a duly authorized agent of a foreign government
might raise the issue of immunity, but did not deem the authority
sufficiently proved in the instant case. The court, however, did
not rest the decision on this ground, but refused to dismiss the
libel because the ship, though at the time of the accident being
under the command of a captain hired by the Mexican agent,
was neither a part of the Mexican public service nor in the
possession of the government. This doctrine of the necessity of
possession for claiming immunity was applied by the court in
analogy to a doctrine developed by the United States Supreme
1 42
Court with respect to property of the United States.
(3)
NEW PROBLEats ARISING OUT OF WORLD WAR.-The
World War and its after-effects presented some new problems.
In the first place-as in England-the problem arose as to the
position of private ships requisitioned by foreign governments.
The question never was passed upon by the Supreme Court,14 3
and the lower federal courts disagreed. Some decisions denied
immunity because the requisition did not give the foreign government sufficient possession, 44 others intimated or held that such
45
ship partook of the immunity enjoyed by foreign public vessels.1
42

3. Namely in the case of The Davis, (1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 15, 19
L. Ed. 875; see also United States v. Wilder (C.C. Mass. 1838) 3 Sumner
308, Fed. Cas. 16,694. But in these cases no vessels, but other property was
concerned. In England the doctrine of possession as a prerequisite for the
immunity of a vessel of the Crown was repudiated, at least by dictum, in
Young
v. S. S. Scotia, [1903] A. C. 501, 72 L. J. P. C. 115.
i 43 In Ex parte Muir, (1921) 254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185, 65 L. Ed.
383, the question came before the Supreme Court on a petition for a writ
of prohibition and a writ of mandamus, but the court dismissed the petition
because the question of immunity was not properly raised; it conceded,
however, that "no decision by this court up to this time can be said to
answer
it."
144 The Attualit , (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 910 (libel for
collision between plaintiff's vessel and The Attualit.i, a privately owned
Italian vessel requisitioned by the Italian Government; on the suggestion
of the attorney general to release the vessel the court held that the Italian
Government had not such "actual possession, custody and control" as to be
entitled to immunity, as the persons in charge were paid by the owners) ;
Maru Navigation Co. v. Societ Commerciale Italiana di Navigation, (D.
Md. 1921) 271 Fed. 98 (foreign attachment of vessel in libel in personam,
brought against owner for salvage services rendered to other vessel of
defendant, was upheld, although the vessel was requisitioned by the Italian
government and had an Italian officer on board to take command in
certain contingencies. An alternative ground for upholding the attachment
was that the claim to immunity was improperly made). In SocietA Commerciale Italiana di Navigazione v. Maru Nay. Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1922)
280 Fed. 334, the circuit court of appeals affirmed the decision on the
latter ground alone; certiorari denied by Supreme Court, (1922) 259 U. S.
584, 42 Sup. Ct. 586, 66 L. Ed. 1075.
145The Athanasios, (S.D. N.Y. 1915) 228 Fed. 558 (foreign attachment in libel in personam for breach of charter. Held: libel dismissed on
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It was further decided that a non-recognized de facto government could not bring a libel in rem in admiralty for the purpose
of gaining the possession of a public vessel which was in the
hands of persons who were still recognized as the representatives
of the nation, 41 and that such vessel was likewise immune from
47
seizure for wages.Y
(4) THE POST-WAR CASES AND THEIR ISSUES.-In the postwar period a number of cases relating to the immunity of foreign
vessels came before the American courts. Among other questions they involved three main issues: (a) what kinds of governmental vessels are entitled to immunity; (b) does immunity mean
exemption from liability; (c) what are the methods in which
immunity must be asserted?
(a) With respect to the first problem the Supreme Court of
the United States decided finally, after having dodged the question
several times, 1 48 that "a ship owned and possessed by a foreign
the merits because non-performance was due to requisition by Greek
Government; but dictum that the requisition prevents jurisdiction over the
vessel); The Luigi, (E.D. Pa. 1916) 230 Fed. 492 (libel against ship
requisitioned by Italian Government for breach of charter. Upon arrest
bond was given by master and the vessel released. Upon suggestion by
the attorney general that the ship was used by a foreign government for
grain transport held that attachment and bond must stand because the
vessel was no longer arrested and bond was given unconditionally; but
court stated that otherwise the attachment would have been quashed) ; The
Roseric, (D. N.J. 1918) 254 Fed. 154 (libel in rem for collision against
The Roseric which was under requisition by British Government. Upon
suggestion of the British ambassador the court stayed all proceedings to
arrest or detain the ship during the requisition but did not quash the writ.
This decision which follows the English practice discussed supra, notes 53
ff., seems somewhat questionable in view of the fact that Rule 10 of the
Admiralty Rules, 28 U. S. C. A., p. 389, provides that in proceedings in rem
"process shall be by warrant of arrest," and thus does not adopt the English
distinction between writ in rem and warrant of arrest, supra, note 55;
see also The Pesaro, (1921) 255 U. S. 216, 217, 41 Sup. Ct. 308, 65 L. Ed.
592: "The decree holds for naught the process under which the ship was
arrested, declares she is not subject to such process and directs her releasein other words dismisses her without day." But the sanfe distinction was
made also in The Gloria, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 267 Fed. 929, (see text to
note 156. In The Adriatic, (E.D. Pa. 1918) 253 Fed. 489, affirmed (C.C.A.
3d Cir. 1919) 258 Fed. 902 the court dismissed a libel in rem and personam
for breach of a charter party due to requisition on the suggestion of the
British Embassy without prejudice because the caese of action stated was
not justiciable in American courts; the jurisdiction over the res was not
discussed.
'46The Rogdai, (N.D. Cal. 1920) 278 Fed. 130. The Court was not
very clear whether it rested the decision on the immunity of the vessel or
the lack of the capacity of the libelants to bring suit in an American
court. The latter ground was adopted in The Penza, (E.D. N.Y. 1921) 277
Fed. 91.
147 The Rogday (N.D. Cal. 1920) 279 Fed. 130.
148The Pesaro, (1921) 255 U. S. 216, 41 Sup. Ct. 308, 65 L. Ed. 592
(the claim of immunity was not properly presented; the court conceded
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government and operated by it in the carriage of merchandise for
hire, is immune from arrest under process based on a libel in rem
by a private suitor."'149 It followed thereby the main trend of the
lower federal courts. 1 0 The Supreme Court's decision concerned
a vessel which was ovnied and operated by the government.
Whether the immunity will be enjoyed also when the vessel is
operated by a private company under a charter from the government was not discussed.. Lower courts seem to have the tendency
to extend the immunity even to such cases.'
(b) The question of the nature of the immunity was another
important issue which was settled by the Supreme Court in the
post-war period. Formerly the American courts seemed to have
had little doubt that the immunity of governmental vessels was
that the issue as such was "as yet an open question") ; The Carlo Poma,
(1921) 255 U. S. 219, 41 Sup. Ct. 309, 65 L. Ed. 594 (decree of circuit
court of appeals granting immunity vacated because of lack of appellate
jurisdiction) ; Ex parte Hussein Lutfi Bey, (1921) 256 U. S. 616, 41 Sup.
Ct. 609, 65 L. Ed. 1122 (writ of prohibition denied to representative of
Ottoman Government claiming immunity of trading vessel, because jurisdiction was debatable owning to the fact that the question was "an open one
and of uncertain solution.")
149Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S. S. Pesaro, (1926) 271 U. S. 562, 570, 46
Sup. Ct. 611, 70 L. Ed. 1088.
'5 0 Cf. The Pampa, (E.D. N.Y. 1917) 245 Fed. 137 (Argentine vessel
belonging to the navy but carrying general cargo to port of destination held
immune from arrest); The Maipo, (S.D. N.Y. 1918) 252 Fed. 627:
Chilean governmental vessel chartered to private person for trading
purposes held to be in the possession of the Chilean Government and
immune from arrest); The Maipo, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 259 Fed. 367 (other
libel against the same vessel) ; The Carlo Poma, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1919)
259 F. 369 (immunity of Italian governmental vessel engaged in carrying
cargo commercially; decree vacated by the Supreme Court on procedural
grounds, The Carlo Poma, (1921) 255 U. S. 219, 41 Sup. Ct. 309, 65 L.
Ed. 594); The Pesaro, (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 468 (immunity
granted to Italian trading vessel). Contra: The Pesaro, (S.D. N.Y. 1921)
277 Fed. 473 (immunity denied to Italian trading vessel. This decision was
rendered by Judge Mack in the same suit which previously had come
before the Supreme Court in (1921) 255 U. S. 216, 401 Sup. Ct. 308, 65
L. Ed. 595; it was later vacated by consent of the parties, and thereupon
the court through Judge Augustus Hand made the above mentioned
opposing decision in (S.D. N.Y. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 468. The decision of the
Supreme Court in Berizzi Bros. v. Pesaro, (1926) 271 U. S. 562, 46 Sup.
Ct. 611, 70 L. Ed. 1088 (discussed supra, text to note 149) was rendered
in a separate suit arising out of the same facts.)
151Cf. The Maipo, (S.D. N.Y. 1918) 252 Fed. 627, (S.D. N.Y. 1919)
259 Fed. 367, mentioned, supra note 150; The Imperator, (S.D. N.Y. 1924)
(1924] 1 Am. Marit. Cases 596 (libel against The Berengaria for a
collision, which occurred while The Berengaria (the former Imperator) was
operated by the Cunard Company for the British Government on a commission basis. Later the Cunard Company bought the Berengaria. Libel
dismissed on grounds of substantive law cf. infra text to notes 157 ff. but
dictum that before the sale the British Government would have been
entitled to immunity.)
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5 2
a mere procedural matter."
But in the two cases of The Western
Maid and of The Thekla the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Holmes reshaped this area of the law. In the former case 53 the
issue was whether a maritime lien could be enforced against a
vessel in the hands of a private owner for a tort committed while
the vessel was employed by the United States for public 54 purposes. The court answered in the negative, mainly because of its
aversion against rights without remedies expressed in the famous
epigrammatic sentence: "Legal obligations that exist but cannot
be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but are elusive to
the grasp." The question arose immediately whether this decision meant to deny the liability of a government-operated vessel
under all circumstances. 5 5 Mrs. Justice Holmes soon had occasion to interpret his opinion. The lower federal courts had per-

l2The matter was considered as being alike in regard to the immunity
of foreign governments and to the immunity of state or federal government.
Of the cases which contained statements to the. effect or decided that the
immunity from arrest did not exclude liability of the vessel as a matter of
substantive law, may be mentioned The Siren, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 152,
19 L. Ed. 129 (regarding tort liability of a vessel captured by the United
States); The Sapphire, (1870) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 164, 20 L. Ed. 127 (libel
by Emperor Napoleon against American vessel for collision between her
and a French naval transport; held, both parties being at fault the damages
ought to be divided); The Florence H., (S.D: N.Y. 1918) 248 Fed. 1012
(libel against the Florence H, which immediately, after construction had
been requisitioned by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet
Corporation; she had been chartered by the Board to the French Government for one trip, and during this trip, while being operated by a French
crew had collided with the boat of the libelants. Held that the vessel was
liable to arrest under the Shipping Act and that "a lien of collision arose
against the ship at a time she was in the possession of the French republic
and in charge of the French crew); The Roseric, (D. N.J. 1918) 254
Fed. 154, cf. supra note 145: (Judge Rellstab intimated that a ship
requisitioned by the British Government but manned by the owners crew
might be "ultimately" (i.e. after the requisition has ceased) liable for
maritime torts done while under requisition, and refused to dismiss the suit
staying only the arrest); The City of Philadelphia, (E.D. Pa. 1920) 263
Fed. 234; The Ceylon Maru, The Jeannette Skinner, (D. Md. 1920) 266
Fed. 396; The Gloria, The Freedom, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 267 Fed. 929;
The F. I. Luckenbach, (S.D. N.Y. 1920) 267 Fed. 931; The Carolinian,
(D. Aid. 1011) 270 Fed. 1011 all announcing the rule that a maritime lien
attaches on vessels operated by the United States and may be enforced
after 5the
3 vessel comes into private hands.
1 The Western Maid, (1922) 257 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L.
Ed. 299.
154With respect to requisitioned vessels operated solely as merchant
vessels the Shipping Act of 1916 permitted liability in rem, The Lake
Monroe, (1919) 250 U. S.246, 39 Sup. Ct. 460, 63 L. Ed. 962. This rule
was however changed by Act of March 9th, 1920, ch. 95, 41 Stat. at L. 525,
46 U. S. C. A. sec. 741; cf. Robinson, Admiralty 271.
15O5f course, the case did not affect the personal liability of the
master, cf. The Pizarro v. 'Matthias, (S.D. N.Y. 1852) 10 N. Y. Leg.
Obs. 97, Fed. Cas. No. 11,199 and Percival v. Hickey, (1820) 18 Johns.

(N.Y.) 257.
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mitted cross-libels when the United States had come into court
as a libellant.1 58 Was this ruled out by The Western Maid? In
The Thekla'" it was decided that when the government itself
came into court as suitor it thereby consented that justice should
15 8
be done with regard to the subject matter.
It must be observed that the case of The Western Maid as well
as that of The Thekla involved vessels in the public service of the
United States. The reasoning of both decisions is, however, applicable also to the vessels in the service of foreign governments.159
The lower courts have drawn this conclusion. 8 0 In the case of
The Imperator,16 1 the City of New York filed a libel against The
Berengaria (the former Imperator) because of damages done to
a city boat in 1920. The Berengaria,which at the time of the libel
was owned by the Cunard Steamship Company, had at the time
of the incident been owned by the British Government, but
operated by the Cunard Line on a commission basis for the government in the freight and passenger business. The district
court held that the libel should be dismissed on the strength of
The Western Maid, stating that the defense was "not procedural
but substantive." Another instance is the case of The Nevada, ex
Rogday.6 2 The Rogday was a vessel which originally belonged
to Russia. As has been mentioned before61 3 an attempt to libel
her was made in 1920 by her crew for wages, but the libel was
dismissed because the representative of the Kerensky Government,
15
OThe Gloria, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 267 Fed. 929; The Luckenbach,
(S.D. N.Y. 1920) 267 Fed. 931; The Gloria, The Thelda, The Luckenbach,
(S.D. N.Y. 1923) 286 Fed. 188.
157United States v. Norwegian Barque "Thekla," (1924) 266 U. S. 328,
45 Sup. Ct. 112, 69 L. Ed. 313.
258This rule was later embodied in the statute of March 3d, 1925, 46
U. S. C. A. sec. 783; cf. The Bertie E. Tull, (D. Del. 1935) 10 F. Supp.
492). The statute permits only cross-libels in personam. On the question
of interest in such cases see The Wright, (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1940) 109 F.
(2d) 699. The rule of The Thelda recently has been restricted by the
Supreme Court to the "relationship characteristic of claims for collision in
admiralty" in United States v. Shaw, (1940) 309 U. S. 495, 60 Sup. Ct. 659,
84 L. Ed. 610.
259Upon the reasoning of The Thekla, (1924) 266 U. S. 328, 45 Sup.
Ct. 112, 69 L. Ed. 313, consequently the rule of The Sapphire, 1870 11 Wall.
(U.S.) 164, 20 L. Ed. 127, is still the law. Strangely enough Mr. Justice
Holmes did not cite the latter case in his opinion.
2GOlt might be mentioned that the rule of The Western Maid was also
applied to state governments in The Charlotte, (W.D. N.Y. 1922) 285
Fed. 84.
261The Imperator-Scow D. S. C. 5, (S.D. N.Y. 1924) [1924] 1 Am.
Maritime
Cas. 596.
162Nevada, ex Rogday, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1926) [1926] 1 Am. Maritime
Cas. 531.
3
16 Supra text to note 147.
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which was still recognized, had claimed immunity. Later the
vessel was sold to private persons and called The Nevada. Thereupon the crew attempted another libel. It was again dismissed;
this time for the reason that no lien had ever attached, as a result
of the rule of The Western Maid.
These two cases, The Nevada and The Imperator are noteworthy for two reasons. First they seem to establish the principle that with respect to foreign governmental vessels the procedural and substantive exemption from liability are co-extensive
in American law. Secondly they prove quite distinctly the difficulties in defining the exact scope of these exemptions.
In regard to the first proposition, i.e. coextensiveness of procedural and substantive immunity, consequently an important
difference seems to exist from the English rule as laid down in
case of The Meandros, where liability of a vessel was predicated
on salvage services rendered to a privately owned vessel while
it was under requisition. To be sure, the case of The Western
Maid had dealt with a claim for a tort committed by privately
owned vessel while under governmental requisition by the United
States. The case of The Nevada extended its rule quite logically
to a non-tortious claim (for wages), accrued while the vessel
was operated by a foreign government. But the foreign government was at that time also the owner. From the reasoning employed in these two cases, however, it seems to follow, that no
liability in rem can be forced for any lien claim which otherwise
would have accrued had the vessel not been controlled at that time
by a foreign government though without being owned by it.'6In regard to the second proposition it might be mentioned
that The Western Maid announced its rule for vessels which were
owned "absolutely or pro hac vice" by the federal government.
The three vessels involved in the case, (The Western Maid, The
Liberty and The Carolinian) were apparently operated by navy
crews. In the case of The Imperator the rule was, however,
applied to a vessel operated by private company in private business
on a commission basis. Does that mean that government owner1041n The Gaelic Prince, (S.D. N.Y. 1922) 11 F. (2d) 426 the rule
of The Western Maid was applied to claims against privately owned ships
for salvage services rendered while the vessels were under requisition
by the federal government. There is no reason why requisition by a foreign
government would be treated differently. This case can, of course, hardly
be reconciled with The Davis, (1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 15, 19 L. Ed. 15
which held that a salvage lien attached upon cargo owned by the United
States, provided that The Davis was not impliedly overruled in so far by
The Western Maid. The rule of The Gaelic Prince was apparently approved
in Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. United States, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1930) 49 F.
(2d) 156.
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ship suffices to make the ship immune, even if a private company
has rented the vessel on a bare-boat charter, and vice versa,
would any private vessel chartered to a government on such a
charter be immune?'Gr,
The application of the rule of The Thekla to foreign vessels
presents likewise certain problems. Suppose that a foreign government brings a libel for a collision. Can its vessel be seized
under a cross libel? The Thekla did not deal with this specific
point. But the answer, it seems, should on principle be a negative one. 16
An interesting related problem was presented in the case of
United States of Mexico v. Rask.-67 In this case the United
States of Mexico brought an action in claim and delivery for the
recovery of one of its patrol boats. The defendant alleged that
he was a shipwright to whom the boat was delivered for repair,
and that he was entitled to a lien upon the vessel and its possession
until he was paid for work and materials furnished. The United
States of Mexico objected to the jurisdiction of the court over
any claim asserted by the defendant, and maintained that none
but its claim could be adjudged. The California superior court
directed the return of the patrol boat to defendant. On appeal
the judgment was affirmed by the California district court of
appeal. In the decision judge Marks pointed out:
"A marked distinction between the doctrine of sovereign immunity as adopted in England and in the United States clearly
appears from the decisions of the courts of the two countries.
In England the exemption has been universally held to apply
where the vessel was the property of a sovereign and in use as
an instrument of sovereignty. In the United States the further
condition must exist, except in direct actions against the government, that the vessel or property was not only the property of and
65

An ordinary charter would not make the government "owner pro
hac vice." The Charlotte, (W.D. N.Y. 1922) 285 Fed. 84, 87.
l-The above (note 152) mentioned statute of March 3d, 1925, regulating cross-libel and counterclaims against the United States where the
government files a libel for damages permits explicitly only cross-libels in
personam. 46 U. S. C. A., sec. 783; see also 46 U. S. C. A., sec. 788
safeguarding against any recognition of a lien. In the case of The Gloria
and The Freedom, (S.D. N.Y. 1919) 267 Fed. 929, Judge Learned Hand
granted the motion of the United States to declare its ship which had been
seized under a cross-libel to be immune. See also the dictum in Dexter
and Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1930) 43 F.
(2d) 705, 708: "The courts have been reluctant to seize property of a
foreign government even where the government has consented to the
jurisdiction for the purpose of litigating a claim" (the case dealt with the
question of the enforcement of a judgment by execution).
167(1931) 119 Cal. App. 21, 4 P. (2d) 981.
1
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an instrumentality of sovereignty of the government, but that it
was in its possession at the time of the seizure."
He therefore concluded that under the circumstances of the
case the shipwrights' lien attached and that it could be asserted
in court against the objections, because (a) the United States
of Mexico consented to the rendition of an affirmative judgment
against it by invoking the aid of an American court; and (b)
the claim of sovereign immunity was made by a private attorney
without a showing of any authority on his part to do so. It is
surprising that the court did not mention The Thekla Case,168 but
it would seem that the decision is in accord therewith. It has been
said that The Thekla Case does not authorize the seizure of a
governmental vessel under a cross-libel, 16 9 but in the instant case
the lien was asserted not against a vessel different from that involved in the original suit but against the very one claimed by
70
the governmentY.

In so far the situation resembles much more

the case of The Siren as explained by the case of The Western
Maid.'7 It would seem therefore that the decision is in accord
with the rules developed by the courts in the course of time, even
2
though the result reached is not free from doubtsY
266 U. S.328, 45 Sup. Ct. 112, 69 L. Ed. 313.
text to note 166.
70This distinction was pointed out by Justice Holmes in The Thekla:
"The doubt in this case arises not from the absence of a maritime lien,
but from the fact that the counterclaim is not against the Thelda libelled
by the United States but for affirmative relief against a different vessel."
171(1922) 257 U. S.419, 433, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L. Ed. 299: "The
leading authority relied upon is The Siren, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 152,
19 L. Ed. 129. The ground of that decision was that when the United
States came into court to enforce a claim it would be assumed to submit
to just claims of third persons in respect of the same subject matter'
172No former case is precisely in point. In United States v. Barney,
(D. Md. before 1810) 3 Hughes 545, Fed. Cas. 14,525, where the enforcement of a lien for liverage was denied, the United States had not come into
court to claim the property, but had resumed possession and use of the
chattels. The situation was similar in Briggs v. Lightboats, (1865) 11
Allen (Mass.) 157, where the enforcement of a builder's lien was denied.
These cases are therefore easily distinguishable. In the Briggs Case the
Massachusetts court itself pointed to this distinction by differentiating
clearly between enforcement of a lien by process and by mere detention
(at 184) and by stating explicitly that not the existence of the lien but
merely its enforcement was in question (at 161), citing a decision in the
same case Briggs v. Lightboat, (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 287. But on the
other hand in the latter case the court emphasized also that the lien, being
a builders lien, attached before the United States got title and that the
situation might be different, if a repairman's lien were in question. 7 Allen
(Mass.) 287, 297. A doubt concerning the existence of a repairman's lien
on a public vessel was expressed also by Mr. Justice Story in United
States v. Wilder, (C.C. Mass. 1838) 3 Sumner 308, Fed. Cas. 16,694:
"Thus, for example, it may be true that no lien exists for repairs of a
public ship." In the light of these dicta the main case appears, therefore,
not entirely free from doubt.
us8(1924)

'10 9 Supra,

MINN ESOTA LAW REVIEW

(c) The last of the three issues clarified by the Supreme
Court in the post-war period concerns the method of claiming
immunity.1 7 3

While in England the question seems to have

presented little difficulty, in the United States the practice grew
haphazardly and different modes were employed. 7 4 Disagreement
existed about the propriety of certain practices. Moreover the
courts were hopelessly split as to the binding force and con75
clusiveness of such claims.
In a series of decisions the Supreme Court set out to clear up
the confusion. The first case of this kind was Ex parte Muir,
decided in 1921.76 A libel suit for collision was brought against
a British private vessel. Counsel for the British embassy acting
as amicus curiae suggested immunity because the vessel was
under requisition. The court overruled the petition, and thereupon the master of the vessel petitioned for a writ of prohibition
preventing the district court from proceeding with the suit, and
for a writ of mandamus directing the release of the vessel. The
Supreme Court refused to grant either writ and dismissed the
petition. In the opinion Mr. Justice Van Devanter took occasion
to disapprove of the practice of raising the question of immunity
through private counsel appearing as amicus curiae "as a marked
-7'Cf. Feller, Procedure in Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign
States in Courts of the United States, (1931) 25 Am. J. Int. L. 83, 86;
Stinson, Diplomatic Procedure and the Jurisdiction in Admiralty Over
Vessels Under Requisition to Foreign Powers, (1921) 55 Am. L. Rev.
116; Angell, Sovereign Immunity, The Modem Trend, (1925) 35 Yale
L. J. 150, 164.
174Of the different practices indicated by the cases we may mention
the following: (1) an attorney of the foreign embassy appears as amicus
curiae, cf. Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada, (1908) 197 Mass.
349, 83 N. E. 876. The Johnson Lighterage, (D. N.J. 1916) 231 Fed.
365; The Adriatic, (E.D. Pa. 1918) 253 Fed. 489 (not strictly an immunity case); The Roseric, (D. N.J. 1918) 254 Fed. 154; but contra,
The Luigi, (E.D. Pa. 1916) 230 Fed. 493, see also The Florence H.,
(S.D. N.Y. 1918) 248 Fed. 1012, 1017; (2) the foreign ambassador himself acts as amicus curiae, The Claveresk, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1920) 264 Fed.
276 (not strictly an immunity case) ; (3) the foreign diplomatic representative, his diplomatic status being certified by the state department, submits a "suggestion" of immunity, either directly or through a consul, The
Maipo, (S.D. N.Y. 1918) 245 Fed. 627; The Rogday, (N.D. Cal. 1920)
279 Fed. 130; (4) the foreign diplomatic representative submits such suggestion and appears specially through counsel, The Carlo Poma, (C.C.A.
2d Cir. 1919) 259 Fed. 369; (5) the foreign government appears specially
through counsel, The Pampa, (E.D. N.Y. 1917) 245 Fed. 137; (6) the
foreign government applies to the department of state, which has a suggestion of immunity submitted by the attorney general. The Attualita,
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 909.
'75The suggestion was considered to be binding in The Rogday (N.D.
Cal. 1920) 279 Fed. 130 and The Carlo Poma, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1919) 259
Fed. 369.
176(1921) 254 U.S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185, 65 L. Ed. 383.
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departure from what theretofore had been recognized as the correct practice." Three ways, the court suggested, were the proper
methods:
"As of right the British Government was entitled to appear in
the suit, to propound its claim to the vessel and to raise the jurisdictional question The Sapphire . . . ; The Santissima Trinidad
; Columbia v. Cauca Co. . . . Or, with its sanction, its ac-

credited and recognized representative might have appeared and
have taken the same steps in its interest.

The Anne. .

.

. And,

if there was objection to appearing as a suitor in a foreign court,
it was open to that government to make the asserted public status
and immunity of the vessel the subject of diplomatic representations to the end that, if that claim was recognized by the executive
department of this government, it might be set forth and supported
in an appropriate suggestion to the court by the attorney general,
or some law officer acting under his direction....j77
17
In the case of The Pesaro,'
the court could elevate this very

forceful dictum to a square holding. There the Italian ambassador had made a suggestion of immunity directly to the court on
the occasion of a libel in rem against an Italian vessel. The
department of state had merely certified his diplomatic status
without sanctioning the suggestion. The court held that the
issue of immunity was not properly raised. The same rule was
applied in The Carlo Poea.1 79 The possibility of a "suggestion"
submitted either by a private counsel as "amicus curiae" or by
the foreign diplomatic representative directly thus being eliminated, the next question was as to who was authorized to represent the foreign government "as a suitor" in court and to claim
immunity. In The Sao Vicente"8" the court decided that a consul
general was not so qualified merely by virtue of his office without
special authorization,' and in The Gul Djemal'8 2 this power was
177Ex parte Muir, (1921) 254 U. S. 522, 532, 41 Sup. Ct. 185, 65 L.
Ed. 383.

178(1921) 255 U. S. 216, 41 Sup. Ct. 308, 65 L. Ed. 592.

170 (1921) 255 U. S. 219, 41 Sup. Ct. 309, 65 L. Ed. 594. In this case,
however, the decision rested on a ground of federal procedure.
180(1922) 260 U. S. 151, 43 Sup. Ct. 75, 67 L. Fed. 179. In the case
immunity was claimed for vessels allegedly owned and operated by the
Transportes Maritimos de Estado, purporting to be a department of the
Government of Portugal. The same litigation came again before the
Supreme Court on writ of prohibition by the Portuguese Minister, who
after the first decision had filed a "formal suggestion" which had been
stricken from the files; the writ was denied, Ex parte Transportes Maritimos, (1924) 264 U. S. 105, 44 Sup. Ct. 236, 68 L. Ed. 580. See also
The Sao Vicente (another litigation arising out of the same set of facts),
(C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1924) 295 Fed. 829, holding that the conduct of the
claimant constituted a waiver.
8'lThe court cited The Anne, (1818) 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 435, 4 L. Ed.

428, which involved the right of a consul to assert in American prize proceedings that the capture was made in the neutral waters of his country.
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denied also to the master of a Turkish vessel, even though he
was an officer of the Turkish navy but not performing a naval
or military duty.
While the Supreme Court thus settled some of the conflicts
among the lower courts about the methods of claiming sovereign
immunity and prescribed certain courses of action which must
be chosen for this purpose, 183 one great problem remained open:
that of the binding force of a claim properly presented. This was
one of the issues in The Navemar Case, to be discussed in the
next chapter.
B.

THE

CASE OF THE NAVEMAR AND THEREAFTER

The latest case in which the Supreme Court has spoken in
regard to the subject of sovereign immunity of foreign vessels is
CompaniaEspanola De Navegacion Marithna v. The Navemar.8 4
Like The Cristinait arose out of the Spanish civil war. The Navemar
was a Spanish ship which was libeled in the district court of New
York by the Compania Espanola De Navigacion under the claim
of ownership. She had arrived in New York on a trip from
Argentina. On October 10th, 1936, while lying in the harbor
of Buenos Aires, she became the object of an expropriation decree
by the (loyalist) Government of Spain published in the Gaceta de
182(1924) 264 U. S. 90, 44 Sup. Ct. 244, 68 L. Ed. 574. The same
case previously bad been before the Supreme Court on petition for a
writ of prohibition and writ of mandamus which was denied, Ex parte
Hussein Lutfi Bey, (1921) 256 U. S. 616, 41 Sup. Ct. 609, 66 L. Ed. 1122,
and was then decided by the district court, (S.D. N.Y. 1921) 296 F.

563, 567. The reason for choosing that procedure for raising the issue
of immunity through the master was evidently the rupture of the diplo-

matic relations between Turkey and the United States.
183An improper presentation of the claim by "suggestion" through
the consul does not constitute a waiver of immunity. The Secundus, (E.D.
N.Y. 1926) 13 F. (2d) 469. There several libels were filed, for supplies,
on a bottomry bond, and for breach of affreightment contracts. The court
permitted to raise the immunity issue again "through diplomatic channels."
The Charg6 d'Affaires thereupon filed a claim of immunity, which was
accompanied by a certificate of his diplomatic status by the state department; the latter, however, refused expressly to assume responsibility for
the claim. The court held that this action was not a proper suggestion
"through diplomatic channels." (E.D. N.Y. 1926) 15 F. (2d) 711. It is
somewhat strange that the court failed to consider whether the new claim
was good as an independent intervention by the foreign government as a
suitor as it is purported to be by its terms. Yet, as there was no allegation of possession or control, the decision would nevertheless seem to be
correct. The ship was held liable and ordered to be sold, even though
later the Republic of France claimed to have a first lien. (E.D. N.Y.
1926) 15 F. (2d) 711. The case shows the difficulties which foreign governments have to comply with the requirements by the Supreme Court. See
also infra note 192.
1S(1938) 303 U. S. 68, 58 Sup. Ct. 432, 82 L. Ed. 667.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN VESSELS

Madrid. This decree was communicated by cablegram to the
master on October 16th. On the same day the ship sailed to
Rosario, Argentina, which she reached on October 18th. There
the ship's roll was handed over to the Spanish Consul, who indorsed on it that the ship had become the property of the state.
In this condition the paper was returned to the master after the
ship had gone back to Buenos Aires. This port was left on
October 28th, and the vessel arrived at New York on November 25th. There the trouble began. The Spanish Consul
in New York notified the master to be at the disposition of the
government. The master evidently did not accept the consul's
orders, and at the same time got into quarrels with his crew.
While he went ashore the crew seized the vessel. On December
7th the Spanish Consul removed the master and appointed a member of the crew as successor. On the same day the owners filed their
libel. On December 14th a default decree was entered, adjudging
the libelants to be entitled to possession. When the chief deputy
marshal read the court's decree to the crew, the spokesman for the
latter declared that they refused to recognize the old master, and
thereupon contempt proceedings were brought. The district court,
however, denied the motion because the alleged facts would constitute the basis of proceedings for criminal and not for civil
contempt and because in the absence of violence no criminal contempt was committed. 185 After the default decree the ambassador
of Spain made a suggestion to the court that the ship was owned
by the Republic of Spain and taken in possession by its consul
at Rosario. The reason that he had not acted any earlier was that
he had presented the claim to the department of state, but that
the latter had declined to act. The court refused to set aside the
default because the suggestion failed to show that the ship was
in the possession of and owned by the government, but granted
leave to renew.180 Thereupon the ambassador filed a new application. The district court found'1 7 on the facts that "prior to the
seizure of the steamship Navemar in territorial waters by the
committee of the crew, the steamship Navemar was never in the
possession of the Republic of Spain." With respect to the question of the seizure in New York the court announced :188
"Now the case for the Republic of Spain is certainly no better
185(E.D. N.Y. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 495.
186(E.D. N.Y. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 647.

187(E.D. N.Y. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 153.
188(E.D. N.Y. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 153, 158.
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than that of the Russian Government. On the contrary, its position is if anything not nearly so tenable, for the facts disclose that
disregarding the orderly process of local law, an attempt was
made forcibly to seize property within the domain of the United
States. It is extremely difficult to believe that the claim of immunity set up herein by the Spanish Consul General appearing for
the Spanish Ambassador can stem from such acts. .

.

. Baldly

the question presented is whether a foreign nation can by edict
confiscate property not within its sovereign domain nor otherwise within its possession or control, seize such property within
the sovereign domain of another power, and claim immunity from
suit in the courts of the latter nation. In all reason the answer to
such question must be in the negative."
189
It took
The circuit court of appeals reversed the decision.
the view that the Spanish Government, by reason of its various
acts, was, at least, in constructive possession, which for purposes
of immunity is "as efficacious as actual possession." It stated
furthermore that "the allegations of the suggestion we are bound
to accept as conclusive."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,"'0 and on hearing remanded the cause.'' Mr. Justice Stone, in his opinion, started
with the proposition that court of appeals had taken "a mistaken
view of the force and the effect of the suggestion" made by the
Spanish ambassador. He pointed out that there existed two ways
of setting up the claim to sovereign immunity, namely either
through diplomatic channels or by appearance as a claimant.
Only if the first method is chosen and the claim is recognized and
allowed by the executive department the courts are bound,
whereas otherwise the claim is an "appropriate subject for judicial inquiry." In the instant case the latter course was adopted.
Therefore the court below had erred in accepting the claim as
binding:
"The filed suggestion, though sufficient as a statement of the
contentions made was not proof of its allegation. This court has
explicitly declined to give such a suggestion the force of proof
coming from the executive deor the status of a like suggestion
partment of our government."' 92
189 (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1937) 90 F. (2d) 673.
190(1937) 302 U. S. 669, 58 Sup. Ct. 35, 82 L. Ed. 516.

191(1938) 303 U. S. 68, 58 Sup. Ct. 432, 82 L. Ed. 667.

192(1938) 303 U. S. 68, 75, 58 Sup. Ct. 432, 82 L. Ed. 667.
The application of the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in Ex
parte Muir and The Navemar has caused certain difficulties to the lower
courts and the foreign governments which try to comply with the Supreme
Courts requirements. The case of The Secundus (E.D. N.Y. 1926) 13 F.
(2d) 469, 15 F. (2d) 711 (discussed supra note 183) is one of such instances. Others are the recent cases of Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
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On the merits the court agreed with the district court that
there was no evidence at hand to support the claim that the
Navemar had been in possession of the Spanish Government. It
missed further "support for any contention that the vessel was in
fact employed in public service."'91 3 The troublesome question of
the acquisition of control by the seizure through the crew on
American soil the justice dodged acrimoniously with a pleading
point "there was no averment that the alleged seizure by the
members of the crew was an act of or in behalf of the Spanish
Government."''
Consequently the immunity was denied and the case tried on
the merits, whether or not the Spanish Government had acquired
a right to possession as against the owner. The district court 9 '
heard additional evidence and concluded that the additional proof
did not support any claim to immunity.9 6 The court further held
that the decree of October 10th, 1936, was in effect a penal statute,
(1939) 281 N. Y. 362, 20 N. E. (2d) 81 and Hannes v. Kingdom of
Roumania Monopolies Institute, (1940) 260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. 825.
In the Lamont Case the Committee of Bankers on Mexico asked to be
instructed how to distribute certain funds. The Mexican Government
claimed ownership in these moneys and appeared specially to assert sovereign immunity. The United States attorney "presented" a suggestion of
immunity at the request of the secretary of state through the attorney general "for such consideration as the court may deem necessary and proper."
The court of appeals of New York held that this suggestion did not
indicate that the executive branch had admitted the claim and remanded
the cause for trial on the merits. In the Hannes Case a plea of immunity
made by the Kingdom of Roumania to the secretary of state was transmitted in similar fashion to the supreme court of New York by the
United States attorney in an attachment of a bank account of a Roumanian
governmental corporation. The court consequently felt free to inquire into
the merits of the claim. It seems that the difficulties arise mainly on account of an elusive practice of the state department, which pursues a
threefold course by either (a) refusing to act or (b) by suggesting itself
immunity or (c) by merely transmitting a claim for proper consideration
by the court as a matter of comity without taking a stand on it. This
latter procedure being not within the purview of the rule laid down by
the Supreme Court might be diplomatically wise, but creates the difficulties.
Professor Deik seems to have overlooked this aspect of the question in
The Plea of Sovereign Immunity, (1940) 40 Col. L. Rev. 453. The English
evasive practice with respect to the question of recognition has caused
similar complaints. See Lauterpacht, The Form of Foreign Office Certificates, (1939) 20 Brit. Yearbook of International Law 125.
193 (1938) 303 U. S. 68, 76, 58 Sup. Ct. 432, 82 L. Ed. 667.
104 (1938) 303 U. S. 68, 72, 58 Sup. Ct. 432, 82 L. Ed. 667.
'Or(E.D.
N.Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 495.
o0O"The additional evidence fails to support the contention that prior
to the arrival in the territorial waters of the United States The Navemar
had been in the possession of the Spanish Government, nor do I find
proof of recognition by the ship's officers that they were controlling the
vessel and crew in behalf of their government." (E.D. N.Y. 1938) 24 F.
Supp. 495, 499. "And there is an entire absence of proof that the vessel
was employed in the public service." (E.D. N.Y. 1938) 24 F. Supp. 495, 500.
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and consequently did not convey a right to possession to the
Spanish Republic which the American courts could recognize.
The order dismissing the intervention was reversed by the circuit
court of appeals. 1
Judge Augustus Hand pointed out that the
Supreme Court had referred back only the question of title and
right to possession, and not the question whether the Navemar
was immune from judicial process. 198 He took the view that the
Spanish Republic had established title and right to possession by
virtue of the decree of October 11th, 1936. This decree, he
pointed out, became operative at the latest when The Navemar
had reached the high seas after her departure from Argentina, and
the American courts had no reason to refuse to give effect thereto."' The possession of the ship was therefore decreed to the
Spanish consul at New York. There the controversy ended because on the defeat of the old Spanish Government, the ship was
released after one more procedural mishap 200 and sailed on April
22d, 1939.2.1
The next reported decision directly in point is Ervin v. Quintanilla.20 2 This case likewise involved a libel in rem for possession arising out of an expropriation decree. The steamship San
Ricardo belonging to the Compania Naviera San Ricardo, a
Mexican corporation, arrived on March 9th, 1938, in the port of
Mobile, Alabama, for the purpose of repairs. On March 18th
the boat was expropriated by decree of the Mexican Government.
This decree was communicated to the Mexican consul at New
Orleans, who thereupon and in accordance with specific instructions proceeded to Mobile. Master and crew as well as the
Alabama Drydock Company accepted the vessel as being from
then on in the possession of the foreign government. On April
2d, 1938, the temporary receiver for the assets in Alabama of
the Compania Naviera San Ricardo libeled the boat and the
Mexican Charg6 d'Affaires appeared specially to claim immunity.
The district court granted the motion, which on appeal the circuit
court of appeals upheld. Judge Hutcheson, in a well reasoned
opinion, pointed out that it was not material that the taking of
197(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 444.
8
19
(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 444, 446.
99

' The same view with respect to the effect of the expropriation decrees was adopted in Linea Sud-Americana v. 7,295.40 Tons of Linseed,
(S.D.0 N.Y. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 210.
2 OThe Navemar, (C.C.A. 2d. Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 873.
201
2 New York Times, April 23, 1939, p. 22.
02(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 935, certiorari denied, (1939)

306 U. S. 635.
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possession had occurred within American jurisdiction, since it
203
was peaceful without any invasion of American sovereignty.
He emphasized that the object taken was a vessel in navigable
waters, not an ordinary chattel on land. He confined the issue
decided very carefully:
"All that is here for decision is whether the Republic of Mexico may have immunity as to this ship, a Mexican ship, owned by
a Mexican company, documented in Mexico and flying the Mexican flag when as here, she has taken peaceably possession of it in
our waters through her lawful agents and representatives, and
properly
presents and presses her claim based upon that posses20 4
sion."

The court evidently did not worry about the other prerequisite
for immunity which was re-emphasized in the Navemar decision
of the Supreme Court, i.e. "support for any contention that the
vessel was in fact employed in public service." It seemed to imply
that the purpose for which the vessel was expropriated in connection with the gaining of actual possession while the ship was
still in repair sufficed. But here is a point where future cases
may bring some new difficulties in spite of the rule of Berizzi
20 5
Brothers v.Pesaro.
The latest decision bearing on the question is the case of
Yokohanuz Specie Bank v. Chengting T. Wang.2 0 It involved a
curious situation created by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The Chinese Yung Yuan Steamship company had entered into a
charter party with a Japanese concern for the transportation of
melting scrap to Japan. For the performance of this contract
the Chinese company bought the steamship Edra Christensen in
the United States. The American registry of the vessel was
cancelled, her name changed into Kuang-Juan and provisional
registry was issued by the Chinese consul general. When the
203
"The taking of possession in this case was not an act of sovereignty
in the sense the appellant means, the exertion of superior force, in order,
without our consent, to violate our sovereignty or override the operation
of our laws. It was merely a series of physical acts done by the consular
representative of Mexico in its behalf, and of acceptance of those acts by
the master and the crew and by the ship building company, all of this
accomplished peaceably, completely without disorder and entirely in subordination to the sovereignty and laws of the United States. . . . Since
the right and title of the government is not in issue, but merely its
possession, we think it clear that the possession taken here, pursuant to
an expropriation in Mexico is no different in incidents, quality and effect
from one taken pursuant to a voluntary transfer." (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938)
99 F. (2d) 935, 940.
2"(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 935, 941.
-,(1926) 271 U. S.562, 46 Sup. Ct. 611, 70 L. Ed. 1088.
06(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 329.
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scrap was placed upon the vessel the consul general refused to
deliver the registry to the master and as a result the vessel could
not sail. Thereupon plaintiff, the holder of the bill of lading
for the scrap, filed a possessory action against the cargo. The
relief sought in the libel was
"that process issued against the scrap and that all persons
claiming any interest therein be cited to appear; that the libellant
given possession of the cargo upon surrender of the bills of lading
and that the court made an appropriate order as to the movement of the ship, to facilitate the discharge of the cargo. 2 °7
The United States marshal went on board of the vessel, had
the monition read to the crew and attached a copy to the bulkhead of the saloon of the vessel. Four days later the Chinese
government expropriated the vessel and the following day the
Chinese consul general took possession of the vessel. The Chinese
ambassador then intervened and claimed that the court had no
jurisdiction over the vessel. The district court dismissed the
libel, and on appeal the decree was affirmed. The libelant had
contended in the first place that the court had acquired jurisdiction and that the subsequent expropriation could not divest the
court thereof, and in the second place that according the immunity would be tantamount to permitting belligerent seizure in
neutral territory. The Court of Appeals speaking through judge
Healy answered the first argument by pointing out that there had
been no libel against the vessel and no arrest of it, and that in
addition the arrest of the cargo itself was not valid for lack of
an effective seizure of the cargo itself as required by the admiralty
practice. In refutation of the second argument the court said
that China was not formally a belligerent and that the Chinese
government was entitled to immunity as "the expropriation was
accomplished peaceably and involved no breach of American neutrality." Therefore the lower court was "right in refusing a
decree directing the movements of the vessel or the use of its
gear."
It is submitted that the reasons given for the decision are
rather confusing. The court failed to distinguish between lack of
jurisdiction because of defective service and lack of jurisdiction
because of sovereign immunity. It really wished to dodge the
delicate question whether sovereign immunity could still be acquired by a foreign state with respect to the vessel once the court
had assumed jurisdiction in favor of a private party. Yet, if no
207 (C.G.A. 9th Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 329, 330.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN VESSELS

proper arrest was accomplished, then the whole question of immunity was really obiter and irrelevant.
Furthermore the court seemed somewhat hazy on the distinction between jurisdiction over the cargo and jurisdiction over the
vessel. In this connection very intricate questions suggest themselves. Can there be a valid arrest of non-exempt cargo on board
of an immune vessel? In the instant case the court would not
have had to answer this question even if the expropriation had
anteceded the arrest, because the relief prayed was that the court
direct the movements of the vessel. The court refused to grant
it bcause the vessel as such was not arrested and because she
was immune. If we disregard the first ground, this means that
immunity implies that the vessel is liberated from any interference
with her movement through judicial order. Even if that be
accepted, however, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that no
jurisdictional act could be exercised on board.208 It only follows
that any seizure not succeeded by removal of the cargo can be
made illusory by the sailing of the immune vessel. And the
question might arise whether this will not always be so even
though the vessel is a private one and not immune.2 0 9
Perhaps the most interesting feature of The Navemar and
The Ervin decisions and also of The Kuang Juan Case consists
in their shedding new light on the necessity of possession as
prerequisite to the sovereign immunity. Sufficient possession
must be established to the satisfaction of either the department
of state or the courts. What is and what is not sufficient possession is not an easy question. On the one hand it need not be
"lawful" possession. The opinions in the Ervin and the Kuang
-0osV\re wish to say no more than that no lack of jurisdiction for
seizures on board follows necessarily from the lack of jurisdiction to

control the movement of the vessel. Whether immunity of vessels is accompanied by an immunity of the cargo on the vessel is a question which
we have purposely left outside the scope of this article as was said above
in the
first section.
2

0oCargo on a vessel owned by a third person can, probably, be seized

the same way as property in the house of a third person (see 25 Am.

Dec. 167; 57 A.L.R. 210.) If the seized cargo is left on board a removal

of the boat might constitute a contempt of court (as does a removal of

the boat, if the boat is arrested, The Victor Pretot, (1898) 14 Times
L. R. 244, The Seraglio, (1885) L. R. 10 P. D. 120, (1885) 54 L. 3. P.
261.) But this is a dubious proposition. Even more open to question is
whether the fact of a maritime lien on the cargo would entitle the
lienor to an arrest of, or a court order directed against, the vessel. It is
strange that there seems to be no direct authority on these points. But cf.
Spoor v. Spooner (1847) 12 Met. (Mass.) 281, holding that removal of a
boat after notice constitutes no unlawful imprisonment of an officer who
came on board for the purpose of making an arrest.
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Juan Cases state that the possession might be gained in American
territorial waters by acts which constitute a tort against the owner,
at least in case the acquiring state is the state of registry, provided
that the act of transfer does not constitute a breach of the peace, a
contempt of court or a violation of the local sovereignty or neutrality; otherwise the privilege of immunity might be forfeited.
On the other hand the possession probably need not amount to
"legal" possession.2 10 The courts in The Imperator2 "' as well as
in the Ervin Case have shown a tendency to relax the strict view,
once expressed by the Supreme Court with respect to United
States property in The Davis.21 2 In the Imperator Case the
Cunard Line, and in the Ervin Case the shipbuilder in all likelihood had "legal possession." Yet the fact that in the former
case the ship was operated on a commission basis for the foreign
sovereign owner, and that in the latter case the shipbuilder agreed
to hold it for the foreign government, was deemed to establish
sufficient "possession." In The Rask213 case the shipbuilder held
214
adversely, which constituted a radical difference.
The most important problem which the American Supreme
Court will have to decide in the future is as to whether any form
of governmental operation and management will be within the
privilege of sovereign immunity of a foreign state or whether the
setup of separate agencies will destroy it. So far it has dodged
2 15
the question skillfully.
21 0

0n the significance of "legal possession" see Shartel, Meanings of
Possession, (1932) 16 MINNESoTA LAw REvmw 611.
211(S.D. N.Y. 1924) [1924] 1 Am. Maritime Cas. 596.
212(1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 15, 19 L. Ed. 875.
213(1931) 119 Cal. App. 21, 4 P. (2d) 981.
214See also The Maipo, (S.D. N.Y. 1918) 252 Fed.

in The Attualit,

627. The decision
(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1916) 238 Fed. 910, seems to be clearly

wrong under the modem view.
21 5
See The Sao Vicente, (1922) 260 U. S. 151, 67 Sup. Ct. 179, 43
L. Ed. 15; Ex parte Transportes Maritimos, (1924) 264 U. S. 105, 44
Sup. Ct. 236, 68 L. Ed. 580; Transportes Maritimos Do Estado v. Almeida,
(1924) 265 U. S. 104, 44 Sup. Ct. 449, 68 L. Ed. 932. An interesting and
well considered state court decision on the point but not dealing with
vessels is Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute (1940)
260 App. Div. 189, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 825. The legal forms in which a
state can own and operate a vessel are multifold. It may be the sole owner
of all the stock of an ordinary private corporation; it may incorporate
specifically for that purpose, but the corporate structure being similar
to an ordinary corporation; it may set up completely new forms of
"public corporations" for that purpose; finally it may create just "separate governmental agencies or departments." Should, and how far should,
the position of these instrumentalities under their own domestic law be
decisive for their treatment in a foreign court? It may be remembered that
the United States, waiving certain aspects of its immunity in domestic
courts, explicitly reserved its foreign immunity. 46 U. S. C. A. sec. 747.
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IV.

SOME COMPARATIVE REMARKS

Space forbids giving any detailed account of the non-AngloAmerican practices. 216

Only a few remarks may be permitted.

As in Anglo-American law, the scope of the immunity of foreign
government vessels in other jurisdictions depends on two basic
factors, namely: in the first place upon the policies and notions
underlying the accordance of immunity to foreign states in general;
and second, no less upon the legal concepts and procedural
mechanics of foreign admiralty law and practice. Differences in
that respect have, as is well known, caused not infrequent difficulties to Anglo-American courts. 17
Above all it is to be noted that on April 10th, 1926, at Brussels eighteen states signed a convention on the immunity of government vessels.218 The convention was supplemented by a Protocol of May 24th, 1934.21- 9 The convention and protocol which
are ratified now by thirteen states, 220 went into force on January
Sth, 1937. The convention establishes immunity from proceedings
in rem, seizure, arrest and detention for vessels owned or operated by a foreign government, and used at the time the cause
22
of action arises in Governmental and non-commercial service. 1
The protocol extends the immunity from seizure, attachment and
detention to vessels chartered by the foreign government for such
On the question of domestic immunity of governmental instrumentalities
see Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., (1939) 306 U. S.
381, 59 Sup. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784.
2LOThe

best survey is probably in 2 Gidel, Le Droit International

Public de la Mer (1932)

337 ff., with

an

excellent bibliography on p.

338. A series of surveys of the different national practices w'as published
in 34 Revue International de Droit Maritime (Germany, United States,
France, Great Britain) and in Nos. 50, 52, 54 of the Bulletin du Comit6
Maritime International (Denmark, Italy, Japan, Norway, Netherlands,
Sweden). See also the report of Professors Magalhaes and Brierly, Subcommittee of the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification
of International Law, Legal Status of Government Ships Employed in
Commerce, League of Nations 1926 V. 9, C. 52, M. 29. See also Baldoni,
II Mare Territoriale (1934) pp. 110, 114; Van Praag, Juridiction et Droit
International Public (1915), Supplement 1935, who discusses the problems
on various places; Fedozzi, La Condition Juridique des Navires de Commerce, (1925) 10 Receuil des Cours, Academie de droit international 1;
Fairman, Some Disputed Applications of The Principle of State Immunity,
(1928) 22 Am.J. Int. Law 566, 579.
2l7See e.g. The Colorado, [1923] P. 102, 92 L. J. P. 100, The Zigurds,
[1932] P. 113, 101 L. J. P. 75.
218176 League of Nations Treaty Series 200. The convention was
signed a few days later by Portugal as the nineteenth state.
210I76 League of Nations Treaty Series 214.
220
Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands, Roumania, Portugal, Sweden and Norway.
221Ar. 3, sec. 1.
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use and to vessels acquired or operated by them at the time of
the proceedings and used for non-commercial purposes. 22 The
convention (which is in Germany applicable also to non-signatory
powers) 223 has found an interesting construction by the German
Supreme Court in a judgment of May 16th, 1938. 224

The decision

involved a collision between plaintiff's and defendant's vessels.
The defendant was a foreign private corporation under the control of the foreign state. That state had transferred the vessel
in question to the defendant, to be equipped and operated by the
corporation in governmental interest. It was registered in the
name of the corporation. The vessel was chartered by the government for a period of twelve months to carry coal for the navy.
Plaintiff obtained a warrant for arrest, and sued defendant for
the enforcement of his maritime lien or damages. The defendant
claimed immunity from this suit. The Supreme Court refused
to grant the motion. It pointed out that according to the issue
before the court it was not concerned with the freedom of the
ship from arrest or seizure, but merely with the suit in rem and
in personam. In the opinion of the court the ship was neither
owned nor operated by the foreign government, but merely chartered. As the Protocol does not forbid proceedings in rem
against a private owner, but only arrest and detention, a judgment for the enforcement of the lien as well as for damages
could be rendered against the private corporation. The fact that
the state had transferred the ship to the corporation for the state's
own use was held to be immaterial.
Apart from the convention customary international law applies. In Germany it had been held before the Brussels convention changed the law that no suit in personam against a foreign
government was possible for a collision with a vessel owned by
the same and used for trading purposes. 22 5 It had also been
held that a vessel which was owned by the United States but
operated in commercial service by a private corporation as mere
agent for the foreign government was not liable to seizure against
the objections of the United States. 228 But an arrest was upheld
222Articles I and II.
223See German Supreme Court (1938)
157 R.G.Z. 389, 394.
224(1938) 157 R. G. Z. 389. The decision is translated into French in
(1939)
39 Revue de Droit Maritime Compar6 51, with comment at 61.
22
5The case of The Ice King, Supreme Court of Germany, Dec. 10th,
1921, 103 R. G. Z. 274. The Supreme Court observed that the instant suit
was a claim in personam, but intimated that the same immunity would
also apply to a judgment for the enforcement of a lien.
22
0The case of The West Chatala, Supreme Court of Germany, Dec.
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in a case where the Portuguese Government had transferred a
vessel to the management of a private corporation for the22latter's
7

account and only the corporation had claimed immunity.

In France the Court of Cassation established in a famous decision of January 22d, 1849, that foreign states were immune
from suit in French courts even with respect of causes of actions
arising out of ordinary contracts. 2 8 The immunity extends also
to preliminary attachments (saisie conservatoire or saisie revendication) of and execution upon property of foreign states, even
when it is in the hands of third persons. 220 In consequence of this
rule it has been held that ships owned by foreign governments
cannot be subjected to seizure. 230 This is true even though the
ship is only confiscated by the foreign state as a result of war and
operated by a private corporation for private purposes. 231 On
the other hand the mere fact that a privately owned vessel renders certain public services to the foreign government is apparently per se not regarded as sufficient ground for immunity.

23 2

10th, 1921, 103 R. G. Z. 280. The court gave decisive weight to the fact
that the private corporation, the American Line, did not act as "operator
for its
22 7own account" in the sense of art. 510 of the German Commercial Code.
The case of The Coimbra, Appellate Tribunal of Hamburg, May

30th, 1923, (1923)

54 Hanseatische Gerichtszeitung 178. The court stated

that the Portuguese Government could not have claimed immunity successfully under the circumstances of the case, because the defendant operated the
vessel for its own account within the meaning of article 510 of the German
Commercial Code. It therefore did not come within the rule of the West
Chatala. The mere ownership by a foreign government was held not to be
sufficient to make the vessel an "exterritorial thing."
22SGouvernement Espagnol c. Lamb~ge et Pujol, Cour de Cassation,
Jan. 22d, 1849, (1849) Dalloz, Jurisprudence GCnrale, pt. 1, p. 5. This
rule has been frequently re-iterated; see, for instance, Humbert c. Etat
russe, Cour d'appel, Paris, Apris 30th, 1912, (1913) Dalloz, Jurisprudence
Gin'rale, pt. 2, p. 201 with note by Prof. Gidel; Hanukiev c. Etat Afghan,
Cour de Cassation, Jan. 23d, 1933, (1933) 1 Gazette du Palais 505; Laurans
c. Gouvernement imperial ch6rifien du Moroc, Cour de Cassation, Nov.
20th,221934, (1934) 2 Gazette du Palais 886.
OVeuve Carratier c. Chemin de fer d'Alsace-Lorraine, Cour de Cassation, May 5th, 1885, (1885) 2 Gazette du Palais 33; see notes, (1937) 2
Gazette0 du Palais, 673 and (1933) Dalloz, Receuil Piriodique, pt. 1, p. 197.
-3 Navire Englewood, Tribunal civil de Bordeaux, April 27th, 1920,
(1920) 47 Jour. du Droit Int. 621 (United States Shipping Board vessel,
operated by Cosmopolitan line); Navire Balosaro, Trib. du commerce du
Havre, Sept. 17th, 1919, (1920) 2 Gazette des Tribunaux 93 (United States
Shipping Board vessel, operated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation);
Navire Glenridge, Tribunal du commerce du Havre, July 17th, 1920, (1921)
32 Revue International du Droit Maritime 599; cf. Allen, The Position of
Foreign
2 1 States Before National Courts (1933) 179.
3 Navire Campos, Tribunal du commerce du Havre, May 19th, 1919,
(1919) 46 Journal du Droit Int. 747 (quashing an attachment of a former
German vessel, confiscated by Brazil and operated by Brazilian Lloyd, for
debts2 32owed to the latter corporation with respect to the boat.)
See the Solunto Case, Cour d'appel d'Aix, August 3d, 1885, (1885)
12 Jour. du Droit Int. 554, in which immunity was granted to a private
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Recently the French courts have shown a tendency to restrict the
immunity of foreign states to causes of actions arising from
acts of sovereignty, particularly (but not exclusively) in cases involving the

Russian Commercial

Representations
23

;

33

however

4

no analogous restriction has been applied
to the immunity
from seizure of foreign governmental property, and quite recently
a Russian trading vessel has been held immune from attachment. 28 5 France has signed but not ratified the Brussels Conventon.
In Belgium the Brussels Convention is in force. Before that
time the situation was somewhat different. Belgian law dearly
restricts the immunities of foreign states from suits to causes of
action arising from acts of sovereignty, 236 but apparently it does
not permit a seizure of foreign governmental property of any
kind.23- At any rate the Appellate Court of Brussels quashed an
attachment of the loading vessels Pangim and Lima, two former
German boats, which were requisitioned by Portugal while lying
in Portuguese waters and operated by the Transportos Maritimos
do Estado. The court held that the Transportos Maritimos were
a mere department of the State of Portugal and that the vessels
were attached to a public use by the latter.238

Another interesting

vessel used as mail packet for Italy because of a French Italian treaty.
The judgment, whose enforcement was attempted that way, arose out of the
collision between The Ortigia and The Uncle Joseph, a cause c~l~bre of
international law. See also 6 Lyon Caen et Renault, Trait6 de Droit Commercial (1932) 818, 2 Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la Mer (1932)
328 ff.
233Union des R~publiques Socialistes Soviftiques c. Association FranceExport Cour de Cassation, Feb. 19th, 1929, (1929) 1 Gazette du Palais 450
and note by Savatier, (1929) Dalloz, Receuil Pdriodique, pt. 1, p. 73; see also
notes, (1933) Dalloz, Receuil P~riodique, pt. 1, p. 197; (1937) 2 Gazette du
Palais 673; 2 Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la Mer (1932) 355.
234
Aget v. Etat Francais et Etat Espagnol, Tribunal civil de Perpignan,
April 7th, 1939, (1939) 2 Gazette du Palais 90; Officina del Aceite c.
Domenech, Cour d'appel d'Aix, Dec. 9th, 1938, (1939) 66 Jour. du Droit

Int. 2596.

35Socifros c. URSS, Cour d'appel d'Aix, Nov. 23, 1938,
(1939) 1
Gazette du Palais 519.
23Socift6 anonyme des Chemins de Fer li6goles-luxenbourgeois c.
Etat n~erlandais, Cour de Cassation (of Belgium) June llth, 1903, (1904)
31 Jour. du Droit Int. 417.
23
7See Tribunal civil d'Anvers, Nov. 11th, 1876, (1877) Pasicrisie
BeIge, pt. 3, p. 28; Mahieu c. R6publique Hell~nique, Tribunal civil
d'Anvers, July 8th, 1932, (1932) 59 Jour. du Droit Int. 1088; see also Allen,
The Position of Foreign States Before National Courts (1933) 211.
238
Steamers Lima and Pangim, Cour d'appel de Bruxelles, June 27th,
1921, (1922) 49 Jour. du Droit Int. 739; Steamer Cunston Hall, Tribunal
du commerce d'Anvers, Feb. 8th, 1924, (1926) 7 Revue de Droit Maritime
Compar6 88.
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case is the matter of the steamer Youlan,2- 1 the Belgian "pendant"
to The Gagara Case. The Youlan belonged originally to the West
Russian Steamship Company. In 1918 she was seized by Finland,
condemned as prize and used to transport foodstuffs for the
account of the government when the vessel arrived in Belgian
waters; the former owners demanded her return to them and
attached her. The court quashed the attachment and dismissed
the action for want of jurisdiction. The court stated that the
question of title was irrelevant, as Finland was in the actual
possession of the vessel, and had not obtained the same through
seizure in Belgian waters. Furthermore, Finland's allegation
that the ship was used for public purposes needed no proof because such requirement would signify an exercise of jurisdiction.
Italy adheres to the "Belgian doctrine" that a foreign state
enjoys immunity only for acts of sovereignty. This has been laid
down very distinctly by the Supreme Court of Italy.2

40

But in

Italy the courts have gone one step further than in Belgium, and
permitted also attachment of and execution on property owned
by the foreign state on Italian territory, except in so far as it falls
within the class of so-called "exterritorial things" as e.g. warvessels.2 41

State owned commercial vessels thus seem to have

been considered liable to seizure. 242 In 1925 a decree was enacted
which made preliminary attachment of and execution upon immovables and movables, ships, credits, negotiable instruments and
other values belonging to a foreign state dependent upon authorization of the Minister of Justice, provided that reciprocity existed.2-1 3 Since 1937 the Brussels Convention has become opera2
tive. 44
2
Tribunal du commerce d'Anvers, Feb. 9th, 1920, (1923) 50 Jour.
du Droit Int. 376.
4'-Five cases of the Italian Supreme Court can be cited for this proposition, namely four decisions involving the Russian Commercial Representations of June 12th, 1925, (1925) II Foro Italiano, pt. 1, p. 830; of July
28th, 1932, (1932) 11 Foro Italiano, Repertorio, sub voce Competenza 38;
of January 18th, 1933, (1933) I1Foro Italiano, pt. 1, p. 1521; of August
3d, 1935, (1935) I1Foro Italiano, pt. 1, p. 1387; and State of Roumania v.
Trutta, March 13th, 1926, (1926) II Foro Italiano, pt. 1, p. 584. For
lower court decisions see for instance Court of Appeals, Genoa, Jan. 22d,
1937. (1937) Monitore Dei Tribunali p. 563.
-4'Roumania v. Trutta, March 13th, 1926, (1926) I1 Foro Italiano,
pt. 1, p. 584.
't2The lower courts and the Supreme Court permitted actions in
personam against the United States Shipping Board. Cf. Allen, The Position of Foreign States Before National Courts (1933) 258, Fairman, Some
Disputed Applications of the Principle of State Immunity, (1928) 22 Am.
J. Int.
Law, 566, 581 note 85.
- 43 Decree of August 10th, 1925, no. 1621, converted into statute by act
of July
244 15th, 1926, no. 1263.
The Brussels convention was made executory by decree of Jan. 6th,
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The last group of decisions to be mentioned in this connection are the cases involving the sovereign immunity of foreign
ships which arose out of the Spanish Civil War. Not only the
English and American courts but also the tribunals of many other
countries had to deal with this problem. 245 These cases concerned in general the claim of immunity made by the Spanish
loyalist government against attachments levied in connection with
suits for restoration of possession by the former owners of the
requisitioned or confiscated vessels. Cases involving the enforcement of ordinary maritime liens against such ships have not been
found. In the first place, the rule laid down by the English
courts was followed also by the courts in Scotland 24 and Northern
1928, no. 1958, converted into a statute by act of June 19th, 1929, no. 1633,

setting the date of entrance into operation at the date when the convention
would come into force, provided that Italy deposited ratification. This

occurred in 1927.
245Cf. Jaenicke, Die Frage der Immunitit in der Rechtsprechung zum
Spanischen Bfirgerkrieg, (1939) 9 Bruns Zeitschrift ffir Auslindisches
Offentliches Recht und V61kerrecht 354; Padelford, International Law" and
Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife (1939) 22. It may be mentioned that
the Spanish Civil War confronted the French courts with many intricate
problems of state immunity apart from the immunity of vessels, particularly
with that of the immunity of the goods which were "evacuated" by the
government and transported to France or kept on vessels in French waters;
see the case of Etat espagnol, Banque d'Espagne c. Banco de Bilbao, Cour
d'appel de Rouen, Dec. 7th, 1937, (1937) 2 Gazette du Palais 965, reversing
Tribunal civil du Havre of Oct. 29th, 1937, (1937) 2 Gazette du Palais 670,
and holding evacuated art treasures on board of the English boat Mydol to
be immune; and the cases of Rousse et Maber c. Banque d'Espagne, Cour
d'appel de Poitiers, July 26th, 1937, (1937) 2 Gazette du Palais 417 and
Rousse et Etat Espagnol v. St6. Sota y Aznar, Cour d'appel de Poitiers,
Dec. 20th, 1937, (1938) 1 Gazette du Palais 167, both arising out of the
same transaction. The first case upheld an attachment (saisie-revendication)
by the owners of valuables evacuated by the Basque Government, which
was levied when these goods were unloaded from one vessel and loaded upon
another vessel, The Aspe Mendi, in French waters, on the ground that the
Basque Government was not a recognized independent government and the
Spanish Government had not acted before the seizure. The second case,
however, quashed an attachment of the cargo on board of The Aspe Mendi
made for the purpose of securing a freight claim, because the writ was
issued by the commercial court and a contract of affreightment by a state
for public purposes is not an act of commerce which justifies such attachment. Cf. Battifol, A propos des Evacuations de Biens Priv6s d'Espagne en
France, (1938) 1 Gazette du Palais, Doctrine, p. 43; Gros, Les Evacuations
de Biens
Espagnols, (1938) 1 Gazette du Palais, Doctrine 47.
2
46Case of El Condado, Greenock Sheriff Court, (1937) 59 Lloyd's
List Law Reports 119: (recall of an order of interim edict against the
master of a Spanish vessel, granted to their owners. The ship was requisitioned in Scotland by the Spanish Consul. The court declared that the

claim of the Spanish Government to a right of possession deprived the
court of its jurisdiction); Case of The Alona Mendi, reported in London
Times, May 13th, 1938, p. 9, col. e (4th ed.). It may be mentioned that
in the Condado Case a subsequent action for wrongful detention brought
by the Spanish Government failed because the requisition in Scotland was
held not to be sufficient to give a possessory title (1939) 63 Lloyd's List
Law Rep. 83, 330. See note (1939) 51 Juridical Review 365.
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Ireland. 247

In France the Court of Appeals of Poitiers248 and

the Court of Appeals of Bordeaux 2 9 held that the immunity of
governmental property could be claimed successfully against attachment by the owners in a suit for restoration of possession.2 50
Similarly the owners failed in two such cases in Belgium. 2 51 The
same is true for the Dutch courts, which in two cases did not
grant restoration to the owners, and refused attachments.2 52 In
-4Case of The Cobetas and other vessels, see London Times, Feb.
11th, 1938, p. 7, col. e; March 31st, 1938, p. 9, col. d.
24sSocift6 Cementos Resola v. Larrasquitu et Etat Espagnol, Cour
d'appel de Poitiers, (1938) 2 Gazette du Palais 169, affirming the order
of the presiding judge of the Tribunal civil de la Rochelle, Oct. 18th, 1937,
(1937) 2 Gazette du Palais 672. Held that the boat Itxas-Zuri which was
requisitioned by a decree of July 17th, 1937, was immune from attachment
by her owners. The court emphasized that the captain was notified of
the requisition while he was in Santander, that the requisition did not
amount to confiscation without compensation, and that the requisition decree
stated that the boat was to be used for public purposes. On the same
day the court vacated an attachment of the requisitioned vessel Juan Artaza
granted by the Tribunal de commerce de la Rochelle to the owners on
October 8th, 1937, Capt. Urrutia et Etat Espagnol c. Soci6t& Artaza y
Compania, (1938) 1 Gazette du Palais 168; the reason was, however, that
the commerce court instead of the civil court had acted and not that there
was an
infringement on immunity.
-4 DAngel Lafuente et Etat Espagnol c. de Llaguno y Duranona, Cour
d'appel de Bordeaux, March 28th, 1938, (1938) 1 Gazette du Palais 714
(held, that the steamship Saturno which was requisitioned by wire while
being on the high seas could not be attached in France in a suit for
restoration). It may be mentioned that the lower tribunal, the Tribunal
civil de Bordeaux, upheld an attachment in another suit because the
Spanish Consul had failed to appear, and the captain was not authorized
to act for the Government, and because the requisition was inserted on the
ship's paper only in the French port, Francisco Agusquiza et Gouvernement
espagnol c. St6. Sota y Aznar, (1937) 2 Gazette du Palais 419.
25OSimiIarly Tribunal de Bayonne, Nov. 18th, 1937, (1937) 16 Revue
de Droit Maritime Franais p. 119.
-51Court d'appel de Bruxelles, July 7th, 1937, Urrutia et Amollobieta
c. Martierena, reprinted in the French (1937) 2 Gazette du Palais 674
(action by the owners against the master of a vessel who had taken possession and command in Spain, held: attachment quashed and action dismissed. The court emphasized that the requisition was no confiscation and
that it had occurred in Spanish waters). Similarly Matter of ship Vasco,
Cour d'appel de Bruxelles, Jan. 17th, 1938, 1938 Rechtskundig Weekblad
Nr. 20, 818 and (1938) 65 Revue de Droit International et de Legislation
Compare 332 (the captain had entered the port for repairs as captain
of a state ship).
2 52
But, conversely, the tribunal of Haarlem in The Sendeja (1937)
1937 Weekblad van het Recht nr. 863 refused a possessory attachment to
the loyalist government. The vessel which was registered in Bilbao had
been requisitioned by decree after the fall of Bilbao. The master first
indicated he would follow the orders of the Spanish (loyalist) consul in
the Netherlands. Later he intended to go back to Bilbao and thereupon
the loyalist government petitioned for attachment. The court declared it to
be against public policy to recognize a requisition decree issued after the
home port had fallen into the hands of the insurgents. The loyalist part
of the crew also had attached the ship for wages. The court declared that
the Spanish consul could not object to a release of this attachment by reason
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one of these cases, that of The Cabo Quintres, later called Baurdo,
the Spanish Government had requisitioned the vessel and later
the Basque Government had chartered the ship to a Russian
Government corporation. While lying in a Dutch port the former owners tried to attach the vessel in connection with a claim
to restoration. The court held that the requisition was a valid
exercise of sovereignty in times of war and civil strife, and that
the use made by the Basque Government, as an autonomous subdivision of the Republic of Spain, could not be questioned. Consequently the attachment was refused.2 53 In the other case, that
of The Vasco, later called Garbi, the attachment was first granted
to the owners, but, on a later hearing, quashed. The court pointed
out that though immunity was not accorded by Dutch law to
foreign governments in actions based on other than sovereign acts
there was no restriction on sovereign immunity where it related
to a question of property. Hence it lacked jurisdiction for an
attachment.2 54

The Supreme Court of Argentina, in the case of

The Ibai, ex Cabo Quilatos, likewise dismissed a suit by the
former owner for lack of jurisdiction because the ship was put
into auxiliary service for the navy, and acts of foreign sovereigns
could not be questioned in Argentine courts.2

5

Finally the Su-

preme Court of Norway refused to take jurisdiction in a contest of
the rival governments for the possession of a vessel in the case
25

of The Guernica.

6

of his immunity, 1937 Weekblad van het Recht nr. 864. The court declined

also to enforce an order of the consul in favor of the loyalist crew. 1937
Weekblad van het Recht hr. 865.

25S(Rotterdam 1937) 1937 Weekblad van bet Recht nr. 913. The
court furthermore refused to release an attachment obtained against The
Baurdo by the Russian charterer. 1937 Weekblad van het Recht nr. 912.
It finally ordered the insurgent part of the crew to leave the vessel. (1937)
1937 2 Weekblad
van het Recht, nr. 914.
54 (Middleburg 1938). 1939 Weekblad van het Recht nr. 96, 1939
Grotius, Annuaire International 118. The vessel had been taken over by

the loyalist government in Spain pursuant to a requisition decree. She

sailed for Belgium. There the former owners tried to attach her, cf. supra

note 251. They failed and tried it again in the Netherlands in the instant
case.2-SSJuly 16th, 1937, (1938) 38 Revue de Droit Maritime Compar6e 50
ff.
25"See London Times, June 29th, 1938, p. 13, col. f; July 9th, 1938,
p. 11, col. a, Oct. 6th, 1938, p. 11. (Because the vessel was permitted to sail

under a loyalist crew, General Franco declared a boycott of all Norwegian
merchant vessels which was called off in October). The Supreme Court of
Norway assumed, however, jurisdiction in a contest for the possession of

property belonging to the Spanish legation in Norway, Rep. of Spain v.
Campuzano, Nov. 2d, 1938, (1939) 33 Am. J. Int. Law 609.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN VESSELS
CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey shows that the problem of sovereign
immunity of foreign vessels, even if confined to the ship itself,
has a somewhat complex nature. In its strict sense it is of a
procedural character: the judicial process must not be directed
against a foreign government and must not affect its operation
of the ship. But in close connection with it two principles of substantive law not infrequently come into operation under appropriate circumstances, namely, that ordinarily 5 7 effect should be
given by the national courts to the acts of a foreign government,
and that a foreign state does not incur liability in the operation of
its instrumentalities and does not subject them to liens which ordinarily result from such liability.
How far the precise scope of this immunity reaches, varies
somewhat in the different national practices. The essential problem is neither to sacrifice the basic national principles of an administration of justice nor to endanger the conduct of international
relations by an undue judicial interference with foreign governmental instrumentalities. In troubled times the emphasis upon the
latter horn of the dilemma may become more pronounced. In general the American practice seems satisfactory in both respects.
2-7While ih the United States a confiscation without compensation will
be recognized, if executed in foreign territory, Shapleigh v. Mier, (1937)
299 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 261, 81 L. Ed. 355, or even on the high seas,
The Navemar, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 444, 450, the French
Supreme Court seems not to give any effect to such confiscation, regardless
of the place of execution, Soci&6 anonyme Potasas Ibericas c. Bloch,
March 14th, 1939, (1939) 1 Gazette du Palais 726. The qualification made
by the Dutch court in the case of The Sendeja (Haarlem 1937) 1937 Weekblad van het Recht nr. 863, viz. that in case of expropriation of vessel the
port of registry must be in actual control of the recognized government
(see supra note 252), seems not to have occurred to the other tribunals.

